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Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, 
and the True Nature of Constitutional Culture 
DONI GEWIRTZMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1981, Richard Parker, then an up-and-coming constitutional theorist at 
Harvard Law School, issued a call to arms to his academic colleagues from the 
"generation of the 1960s." 1 A year earlier, John Hart Ely and Jesse Choper had 
released a pair of books that sought to reconcile judicial review with core 
principles of democratic self-govemance.2 Each had sought to limit the Su-
preme Court's institutional role by allocating much of the responsibility for 
defining constitutional values to the representative branches, confining the 
Court's mission to safeguarding democratic processes from malfunction. 
Ely and Choper's fatal error, according to Parker, was their conclusion that 
American representative democracy is-for the most part-alive and well.3 
Parker reminded them of the large numbers of Americans who do not partici-
pate in the political process, questioned whether citizens can rely upon their 
representatives to reflect their interests, and underscored the difficulty many 
citizens have in determining what their own interests actually are.4 He accused 
them of "obscur[ing] our biased, withered politics in a fog of apologetic 
rhetoric," and justifying a political system that "consecrates the domination of 
our polity by the politically effective few and the reduction of the rest to more 
or less passive consumers of the ministration of govemment."5 
Parker called upon his generational cohort to move constitutional theory in a 
new descriptive and normative direction, reminding his contemporaries that 
they "grew up in an era when it was virtually impossible to feel comfortable 
with the status quo."6 In response to Choper and Ely, he urged constitutional 
theorists to not only adopt a realistic and more critical view of American 
* Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law. I owe considerable thanks to 
Rachel Barkow, Adam Berinsky, Barry Friedman, Daryl Levinson, Robert Post, Mark Tushnet, mem-
bers of the NYU Lawyering faculty-particularly Kerry Abrams, Laura Bradford, Marshall Miller, and 
Juliet Stumpf-along with Nicholas Bagley, Aaron Beim, and the editors at the Georgetown Law 
Journal. 
1. Richard Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 223 (1981). 
2. JESSE H. CHOPER, JumcIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLmCAL PROCESS (1980); JoHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
3. As Parker describes Ely and Choper's theory, while governmental decisionmakers are responsive 
to majoritarian interests, minority interests are generally accounted for through shifting majority 
coalitions that require minority support for governance. In certain discrete cases of system malfunction, 
minorities are unable to compete on the same terms as other political interests. At those points, judicial 
intervention is appropriate. But in general, the representative democratic process is well equipped to 
resolve questions of constitutional meaning. Parker, supra note 1, at 240-41. 
4. Id. at 242--44. 
5. Id. at 253. 
6. Id. at 257. 
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politics, but also to begin imagining how constitutional law might help to 
develop a polity that would better reflect classical republican ideals of equality, 
civic virtue, and a mobilized citizenry.7 
Today, Parker's generation-and its immediate progeny-is ascendant. And 
under its watch, "the People" have become constitutional theory's hottest 
fashion. Yet these scholars, who saw more clearly than most how popular 
engagement can alter the course of history, 8 have retained their elders' limited 
perspective on popular engagement with political life. 
A growing body of scholarship has coalesced around the concept of "popular 
constitutionalism." Following a trail blazed by Robert Cover,9 Bruce Acker-
man, 10 Sanford Levinson, 11 and Parker, 12 among others, more recent works 
include a book by Larry Kramer, 13 a 2003 Foreword by Robert Post, 14 and other 
articles and books by Jeremy Waldron, 15 Kramer, 16 Reva Siegel, 17 William 
Eskridge, 18 Jack Balkin, 19 Keith Whittington,20 Stephen Griffin,21 James Gray 
7. Id. at 258. For similar efforts aimed at integrating classical republican ideals into constitutional 
theory, see, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Coun, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-
Govemment, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond rhe Republican Revival, 97 YALE 
L.J. 1539 (1988). 
8. See generally TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HoPE, DAYS OF RAGE ( 1987). 
9. Robert Cover, The Supreme Coun, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. 
REv. 4 (1983). 
10. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). Ackerman has argued that the People act 
outside the Article V amendment process during isolated "constitutional moments." See ACKERMAN, 
FOUNDATIONS, supra, at 6-7; Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 
YALE L.J. 1013, 1022 (1984). During other periods of "normal politics," the People cede their 
interpretive authority back to political institutions. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra, at 263. Popular 
constitutionalists, by contrast, have advanced constitutional models that bring the People into play 
during eras of "normal politics." 
11. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988). 
12. RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE" (1994). 
13. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(2004). 
14. Robert C. Post, The Supreme Coun, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: 
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv. L. REv. 4 (2003). 
15. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999). 
16. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REv. 959 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism]; Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Coun, 2000 Term-Foreword: 
We the Coun, 115 HARv. L. REv. 4 (2001) [hereinafter Kramer, We the Coun]. 
17. Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspec-
tive, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 297 (2001). 
18. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional 
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062 (2002) [hereinafter Eskridge, Effects]; William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 419 
(2001) [hereinafter Eskridge, Channeling]. 
19. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. 
REv. 1045 (2001). 
20. Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Re-
sponses, 80 N.C. L. REv. 773 (2002). 
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Pope, 22 and Mark Tushnet. 23 
Each argues that the People and their elected representatives should-and 
often do-play a substantial role in the creation, interpretation, evolution, and 
enforcement of constitutional norms. This popular involvement takes place 
through the political process, but outside the formal confines of an Article V 
amendment or a "constitutional moment."24 At times, the People's interpretive 
expression takes place through direct action, like protests, boycotts, and petition-
ing. At other times, the People act through electorally accountable institutions 
and political parties. 
These alternative narratives seek to remove the constitutional lawmaking 
process from the judiciary's exclusive dominion. Constitutional interpreta-
tion-in real or idealized form-is envisioned as the product of a "constitu-
tional culture,"25 a larger community-wide discourse that includes judicial and 
nonjudicial actors, a mixture of legal norms and political actions, and a wide 
range of interpretive expression. 
But while constitutional theory has focused on reconstituting the People as a 
major player in constitutional interpretation, political scientists have been busy 
exploring how the People actually relate to politics and political institutions. 
Their work offers a much-needed snapshot of the political context in which 
constitutional norms are created.26 
The results are not pretty. At precisely the same moment that some constitu-
tional theorists are highlighting popular involvement in the mechanics of consti-
tutional interpretation, political scientists tell us that participation and interest in 
politics are declining.27 Moreover, popular interpretive opinions are often based 
on limited information, and are highly susceptible to manipulation by elites. 
Many citizens engage constitutional culture with a declining sense of their 
ability to grasp critical issues in public life, influence policy outcomes, and 
21. STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CoNSTITlfflONALISM: FROM THEORY TO PoLmcs ( 1996); Stephen M. 
Griffin, What ls Constitutional Theory? The Newer Theory and the Decline of the Learned Tradition, 
62 S. CAL. L. REV. 493 (1989). 
22. James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941 (1997) [hereinafter Pope, 
Labor's Constitution]; James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in 
the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 287 (1990). 
23. MARK TuSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITlfflON AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
24. See supra note 10. 
25. Siegel, supra note 17, at 303 (defining "constitutional culture" as a "network of understandings 
and practices that structure our constitutional tradition, including those that shape law but would not be 
recognized as 'lawmaking' according to the legal system's own formative criteria"); see also Post, 
supra note 14, at 8 (defining "constitutional culture" as "a specific subset of culture that encompasses 
extra judicial beliefs about the substance of the Constitution"). 
26. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PuTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY (2000); STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JoHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1993); SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEGMAN SCHLOZMAN & HENRY E. BRADY, VOICE AND 
EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1995). 
27. This disconnect is not surprising given the comparatively limited attention paid by legal 
academics to political science scholarship. See Keith Whittington, Crossing Over: Citation of Public 
Law Faculty in Law Reviews, 14 LAW & CTs. 5, 9 (2004). 
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perform basic self-governance tasks. 
On one level, popular constitutionalists are simply-and I believe correctly-
recognizing what historians and political scientists have long known: "[T]he 
Constitution lives a vibrant and consequential life outside the courts."28 This 
represents a great leap forward for constitutional theory, which has only re-
cently begun to shift from the normative quest for a Grand Unified Interpretive 
Theory to models that display a deeper descriptive engagement with how our 
constitutional system actually operates. 
But on another level, the divergence between legal academics and political 
scientists shows this academic generation falling into precisely the same trap as 
those that came before. If Ely and Choper's sin was an inability to recognize the 
widening chasm between theory and practice, that gap remains stronger than 
ever. 
The problem begins with "the People," a term popular constitutionalists 
invoke with some regularity but are reluctant to define.29 To the extent there is a 
shared definition, it apparently refers to any participant in constitutional interpre-
tation who is not a federal judge. At different times, "the' People" inhabit the 
shoes of, among other entities, the electorate, prominent interest groups, identity-
based social movements,30 the United States Congress,31 the President,32 politi-
cal parties,33 state government institutions,34 or impact-litigation plaintiffs.35 
The result is an academic construction where "the People" look a lot like 
Woody Allen's Zelig, inhabiting whatever incarnation is needed to conform 
with the theoretical backdrop. 
This lack of definition allows scholars to claim democratic legitimacy and 
invoke a populist legacy for their interpretive narratives without having to 
examine the nuts and bolts of how our political system actually operates. It also 
permits popular constitutionalists to project all sorts of images onto this blank 
slate, including nostalgic portrayals of popular civic engagement from days long 
past. 
Abstractions also dominate normative conversations about popular constitu-
tionalism. Legal scholars have distilled perspectives on "the People" into two 
highly polarized visions: one that trusts the People to make interpretive deci-
28. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: 
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE. L.J. 1943, 2022 (2003). 
29. See L.A. Powe, Jr., Are "The People" Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 Tux. L. 
REv. 855, 891 (2005) (reviewing LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JumcIAL REvrnw (2004)) (describing Kramer's definition of "the People" as "maddeningly ambigu-
ous"). 
30. See Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 18, at 423. 
31. See Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 2004. 
32. See Keith E. Whittington, Presidential Challenges to Judicial Supremacy and the Politics of 
Constitutional Meaning, 33 POLITY 365 (2001). 
33. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 19, at 1077-78. 
34. See Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitutional 
Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 873-75 (1999). 
35. See Eskridge, Effects, supra note 18, at 2071-72. 
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sions about what the Constitution means, and one that does not.36 This stark 
distinction does constitutional theory a disservice by ignoring what is actually 
known about how real, live Americans think and behave. The individual citizen, 
and the actual nature of her relationship with constitutional culture, remains 
largely ignored. 
By treating the People as a construction rather than a collection of real 
individuals who, as it turns out, we know quite a bit about, constitutional theory 
sidesteps many of the more complex and problematic aspects of how popular 
constitutionalism actually works. Hence, in using the term "the People," this 
Article refers to citizens-not elected representatives, interest groups, political 
parties, or other intermediaries. 37 Citizens are, admittedly, only one part of a 
representative democratic culture in which an individual's relationship with 
governance is often mediated by third parties. But defining their identity and 
isolating their distinct role apart from representative institutions is critical, both 
to understanding what popular constitutionalists mean when they use the word 
"popular" and to breaking down the abstractions upon which constitutional 
theory has grown far too reliant. 
In tum, this Article is an effort to use political science to examine how the 
People relate to, engage with, and feel about constitutional culture. It concludes 
that constitutional culture: 
• involves a relatively small number of engaged participants; 
• often acts to reinforce judicial authority; 
• operates with unstable popular preferences that are easily subject to elite 
manipulation; 
• reflects wide disparities in wealth and power that exist within our larger 
political culture; and 
• responds to long-term political trends, including declining civic engage-
ment among younger generations. 
These conclusions-none of which receive any significant treatment in the 
recent popular-constitutionalist literature38 -raise descriptive questions about 
36. See J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935, 
1950-54 (1995) (book review) (distinguishing "populist" and "progressive" influences on constitutional 
theory); PARKER, supra note 12, at 54--65 (distinguishing between "Populist" and "Anti-Populist" 
sensibilities); Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 1003--04 (describing skepticism 
about people and democracy as a pervasive feature of contemporary intellectual culture); LEVINSON, 
supra note II, at 27 (distinguishing between Catholic and Protestant perspectives on constitutional 
interpretation). 
37. See Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism? 118 HARV. L REv. 
1594, 1606--07 (2005) (reviewing LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CoNSTifUTIONALISM 
AND JumcIAL REVIEW (2004) (distinguishing between "The People" as an "organic unity" and '"the 
people' -the collection of human persons who are the citizens or residents of a particular polity"). 
38. Among popular constitutionalists, Bruce Ackerman comes closest to addressing these realities. 
Under Ackerman's theory, constitutional interpretation operates largely under conditions of "normal 
902 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 93:897 
how popular constitutionalism operates today and pragmatic concerns for its 
continued operation and viability. 
Part I sets out two dueling narratives that have defined the current theoretical 
debate about how constitutional law is made and the interplay between law and 
politics. It provides a brief account of the Court's recent efforts to assert its 
interpretive supremacy, and describes popular constitutionalist efforts to cast the 
People as a systemic check on judicial power. 
Part II sets out a conflict between current trends in constitutional theory and 
political science. It accuses popular constitutionalists of maintaining a nostalgic 
view of the People that ignores contemporary political trends, and sets out three 
points of contact between "citizen-interpreters" and constitutional culture: pref-
erences, participation, and legitimacy. 
Parts III, IV, and V examine efforts by political scientists to describe the 
People's relationship with constitutional culture. Part III explores the feasibility 
of popular constitutionalism under current levels of political participation and 
knowledge, arguing that the relatively distant relationship between the People 
and political life creates inhospitable conditions for placing increased interpre-
tive burdens on ordinary citizens. Part IV addresses how interpretive norms 
obtain legitimacy. It uses studies about the People's perceptions of institutional 
processes and their own capacity for self-governance to suggest that popular 
accountability does not necessarily lead to more legitimate interpretive out-
comes. Part V looks at constitutional culture in operation, focusing on how 
participation and knowledge levels affect popular representation, and the influ-
ence of elites on public opinion. 
Part VI examines the theoretical implications of these political trends. It 
challenges popular constitutionalism's portrayal of contemporary politics, and 
questions whether the current political environment is hospitable to interpretive 
models that rely upon significant citizen involvement. Finally, it suggests an 
agenda for a new generation of constitutional scholars, one that draws on a 
shared experience with apathy and alienation from political life during our 
formative development in the years after Watergate. 
This Article operates with two limiting principles in mind. First, in examining 
the People's role in constitutional culture, it is confined to an examination of 
what we know about how citizens determine, communicate, and legitimize their 
interpretive preferences. We do, however, live in a representative democracy. 
By constitutional design, interpretive preferences are filtered through representa-
tive institutions that, as many have noted, play a critical role in the evolution of 
politics," during which "the People simply do not exist" because their political attention and energies 
are focused on other, nonconstitutional matters. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 263. During 
these periods, the Court performs a preservationist function, representing the absent People by acting as 
"an ongoing representative" of constitutional commitments made during periods of heightened popular 
mobilization and involvement. Id. at 264--65. But by eliminating popular engagement in the interpretive 
process during wide swaths of constitutional history, Ackerman is no longer operating within the 
popular constitutionalist model. See Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 961 n.3. 
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constitutional doctrine.39 An in-depth examination of how other political actors, 
including the legislative and executive branches, respond to popular interpretive 
expression is well worthy of further examination, but is beyond the scope of this 
piece. 
Second, popular constitutionalism is often connected to a normative debate 
about the countermajoritarian nature of judicial review. This Article deliberately 
avoids that well-traveled path.40 Instead of focusing upon whether judge-made 
constitutional law is better or worse than law created from other sources, it 
operates from a more descriptive perspective, examining how popular engage-
ment with constitutional culture actually operates. As Barry Friedman has 
noted, an accurate descriptive account of how our interpretive system functions 
has been all too absent from constitutional theory.41 Indeed, such an account is 
necessary in order to fully assess the relative merits of competing normative 
models.42 This is an effort to move that discussion from the realm of abstraction 
and ground it in the reality of contemporary American political life. 
I. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, PoLmcs, AND POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Contemporary constitutional theory is caught in a battle between two differ-
ent stories about how constitutional interpretation occurs. The first--coined the 
"juricentric Constitution" by Robert Post and Reva Siegel-places constitu-
tional interpretation exclusively in the hands of the judicial branch.43 The 
second, offered in different forms by popular constitutionalist scholars, suggests 
a process that is far more complex and posits a greater interpretive role for the 
People. 
39. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REv. 
707 (1985); Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 24 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359 (1997); Robert Nagel, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in 
Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 380 (1988); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What the Law ls, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); David A. 
Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 113 (1993); Whittington, 
supra note 32. 
40. For an exhaustive account of this long-running academic debate, see Barry Friedman, The 
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 333 (1998); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruc-
tion's Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1 (2002); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1383 (2001); Barry Friedman, The 
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 971 
(2000); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman, History Part Five]. 
41. See Friedman, History Part Five, supra note 40, at 257-58. 
42. This assumes, perhaps incorrectly, that constitutional theorists offer theoretical models with the 
eventual goal of implementing these models in the real world. 
43. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric 
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L. REv. 1, 2 (2003). 
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A. THE "IURICENTRIC" NARRATIVE 
The act of unifying a diverse and growing body of scholarship under the 
"popular constitutionalism" mantle is something of a stretch. The works mix 
descriptive and normative assertions, encompassing historical interactions be-
tween law and politics, affirmative assaults on judicial supremacy, and specula-
tion about the current Court's attentiveness to external political dynamics. The 
theoretical conversation also exists at a point of intersection for numerous 
constitutional dialogues, from the longstanding battle over the role of an 
unelected judiciary in a representative democracy to more recent academic hand 
wringing over the federal judiciary's conservative shift in the post-Reagan era. 
Popular constitutionalism, as used here, describes a body of academic work 
that shares a common enemy. As Robert Post and Reva Siegel explain it, 
popular constitutionalist scholars are attacking a story about how constitutional 
law is made.44 That narrative prioritizes stability, embraces legal terminology 
and categories, and above all, places federal courts generally-and the Supreme 
Court in particular-at center stage. 
The story's primary components are two interrelated and reciprocally reinforc-
ing assumptions that find little explicit support in modem academic literature, 
but are nevertheless pervasive within contemporary constitutional discourse: 
judicial supremacy (the notion that judges have the final say in questions of 
constitutional meaning), and the existence of a rigid division between the 
worlds of law and politics. 
In this "juricentric" narrative, the judiciary stands as "the exclusive guardian 
of the Constitution" and the supreme expositor of constitutional meaning.45 
Aside from a few well-documented and oft-repeated exceptions,46 and the 
Article V amendment process, the evolution of constitutional meaning is an 
entirely judge-driven process. 
With judges in the interpretive driver's seat, constitutional law becomes 
nearly indistinguishable from "ordinary law."47 As we do with a run-of-the-mill 
statute, we turn to the courts for answers when a question arises about the 
meaning of a constitutional provision. Judges, in keeping with their training and 
practice, then apply traditional tools of legal analysis that closely resemble 
those used to interpret ordinary statutes.48 
The judiciary's pre-eminent role follows from the assumption that constitu-
tional law is separate from politics, and that this separation is essential to the 
44. See id. 
45. Id. at 2. 
46. Standard examples include Thomas Jefferson's efforts to fight Federalist policies, Andrew 
Jackson's veto of legislation to recharter the Second National Bank, Abraham Lincoln's response to the 
Dred Scott decision, and Roosevelt's battles over New Deal legislation. See Whittington, supra note 32, 
at 369. 
47. See Kramer, We the Court, supra note 16, at 8-9. 
48. See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 18 (1996); 
Kramer, We the Court, supra note 16, at 8-9. 
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very definition of constitutionalism.49 If constitutions are a shared precommit-
ment to preserve longstanding political processes and values in the face of 
impulsive popular and political movements,50 judges--comparatively insulated 
from politics by constitutional design-are the only constitutional actors ca-
pable of interpretive actions consistent with the fundamental purpose of constitu-
tionalism. 51 
The result is a vision of interpretive development that exists firmly outside 
the rough-and-tumble world of political life. 52 As Keith Whittington describes 
it: 
There is a tendency to regard the Constitution as primarily a legal document: 
constitutional law substitutes for the Constitution, and the exercise of judicial 
review is regarded as tantamount to constitutionalism itself; the Constitution 
is considered relevant to politics as a consequence of and only to the extent 
that the judiciary is willing to enforce its terms and block the actions of 
government officials. 53 
In recent years, the Rehnquist Court has evolved into the juricentric narra-
tive's strongest proponent. The primary vehicle for the Court's assertion of 
judicial supremacy has been the curtailment of legislative power under Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants Congress "the power to 
enforce, by appropriate legislation," the Amendment's substantive guarantees.54 
As numerous scholars have pointed out, judicial supremacy is an explicit 
component of the Rehnquist Court's Section Five jurisprudence,55 bringing to 
an end a collaborative effort by Congress and the Court to expand constitutional 
rights during the New Deal and Great Society eras.56 In a recent decision 
upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act against a Section Five challenge, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that "it falls to this Court, not Congress, to 
define the substance of constitutional guarantees."57 This mirrors similar state-
ments in Garrett and Kimel, where the Court held Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act inapplicable to 
state govemments,58 and City of Boerne v. Flores, where the Court held that 
Congress exceeded its Section Five authority in passing the Religious Freedom 
49. See Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 990-91. 
50. See Laurence H. Tribe, The People's Court, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 24, 2004, § 7, at 32. 
51. See Post, supra note 14, at 11. 
52. See Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 1946. 
53. KEITH E. WHITITNGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DNIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
MEANING 1 (1999). 
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
55. See Kramer, We the Coun, supra note 16, at 143-51; Post & Siegel, supra note 43, at 2; 
Whittington, supra note 20, at 776. 
56. See MARK TusHNET, THE NEW CoNSTITUTIONAL ORDER 50-51 (2003). 
57. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003). 
58. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000). 
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Restoration Act of 1993.59 The end result is a clear division of labor between 
the legislative and judicial departments: the Court tells Congress and the People 
what the Constitution means,60 and Congress can only pass legislation to 
remedy a pattern of discrimination that falls within the Court's interpretation.61 
The current Court's assertion of supremacy is driven in no small part by its 
skepticism about democratic institutions and procedures.62 Recent decisions 
cast a suspicious eye on congressional factfinding procedures63 and reveal 
concern about the ability of democratic institutions to provide for their own 
stability without some form of judicially imposed order.64 
The Court's internal discourse also reflects the juricentric narrative's pull 
across ideological divisions. For example, Justice Stevens's dissent in Bush v. 
Gore all but accuses the majority of grounding its decisionmaking in political 
considerations, thus undermining "the Nation's confidence in the judge as an 
impartial guardian of the rule of law."65 Justice Scalia, in tum, in his dissent in 
Lawrence v. Texas charged the Court with "tak[ing] sides in the culture war, 
departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules 
of engagement are observed."66 Each dissent-from opposite ideological poles-
asserts an ideal in which the judicial role is tied to a rigid separation between 
law and politics, and the judiciary stands fully immunized against the corrosive 
effects of political life. 
B. THE POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALIST NARRATIVE 
Against this doctrinal backdrop, popular constitutionalists have developed a 
very different story about how constitutional law is made. In this narrative, the 
People-in one incarnation or another-play an active role in the development 
of constitutional doctrine through a mixture of explicitly interpretive and politi-
cal acts that occur both within and outside the courtroom. 
In the eyes of popular constitutionalists, constitutional law is the product of a 
"constitutional culture" in which judges are only one of many interpretive 
actors.67 As Post explains it, the Court is engaged in a "continuous dialogue 
with the constitutional beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors."68 Nonjudicial 
59. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
60. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 866-67 (1992) (plurality opinion); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
61. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374. 
62. See TusHNET, supra note 56, at 94 ("[A]s the Court sees it, politicians engage in grandstanding 
for their constituents, adopting legislation that seems 'good' in the abstract but that has no decent policy 
justification, and in which, again as the Court sees it, new forms of interest groups, labeling themselves 
as serving the public interest, push legislation forward."). 
63. See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80 (2001). 
64. See Richard H. Pildes, Bush v. Gore: Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. Cm. L. REv. 695 (2001). 
65. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 129 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
66. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
67. See Post, supra note 14, at 11; Siegel, supra note 17, at 302. 
68. Post, supra note 14, at 41. 
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actors mobilize around and stake claims about constitutional meaning, using 
multiple "communicative pathways"-including Section Five-for interpretive 
expression that transcend the barrier between law and politics.69 
In support of their model, popular constitutionalists offer an array of histori-
cal case studies in which interpretive outputs are produced by a dialogue 
between the Court and the People. These examples are rich with accounts of 
popular civic engagement, often expressed through large-scale social move-
ments. In each, the People air interpretive claims through a range of acts inside 
and outside the courtroom, including social activism, mass mobilization, legisla-
tive lobbying, electoral preferences, and the acts of elected representatives.70 
Reva Siegel, for example, recounts the multifront political offensive launched 
by the women's movement in the 1970s to pass the Equal Rights Amendment 
and other pieces of legislation.71 She describes a process in which the move-
ment created constitutional meaning through "constitutional text, collective 
memory, mass action, the techniques of social movement organizing, the begin-
nings of a litigation campaign, the apparatus of the party system, and finally, the 
lawmaking resources of Congress itself."72 In the end, the movement success-
fully advanced a revised set of constitutional norms governing sex discrimina-
tion, despite its failure to formally amend the Constitution.73 
Working in a similar vein, James Gray Pope details American unionists' 
efforts to achieve constitutional recognition for their right to organize. These 
"constitutional insurgents" sought to alter constitutional meaning by communi-
cating and operating outside formal political channels, exercising "direct popu-
lar power, for example through extralegal assemblies, mass protests, strikes, and 
boycotts."74 Pope's protagonists act for reasons beyond mere self-interest, 
seeking instead "the public satisfactions of meaningful public action, historic 
immortality, and social interconnection."75 Other works explain constitutional 
change by focusing on the role of identity-based social movements in the latter 
half of the twentieth century 76 or the concept of "popular sovereignty" in 
69. Siegel, supra note 17, at 300. 
70. Id. at 309, 324. 
71. Id. at 307-13; see also Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 1980-2020 (discussing the Family 
Medical Leave Act). 
72. Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 2001 (footnote omitted). 
73. Siegel, supra note 17, at 311. 
74. Pope, Labor's Constitution, supra note 22, at 944. 
75. Id. at 991. 
76. William Eskridge, for example, describes a process of modern-day constitutional change in 
which constitutional norms are a direct function of the political progress made by a minority group. As 
twentieth century identity-based social movements (IBSMs) gained cohesion, political influence, and 
increased tolerance through social-movement organizing, the Court became more responsive to the 
factual narratives and innovative doctrinal theories that IBSMs offered in the courtroom. The relation-
ship between the IBSMs and the Court proved to be mutually beneficial. New IBSMs, observing the 
political progress of their predecessors, focused their efforts on the Court. See generally Eskridge, 
Effects, supra note 18 (focusing on evolution of constitutional norms governing classifications based on 
race, sex, and sexual orientation). The Court, in turn, has gained "worldwide acclaim and admiration, 
908 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 93:897 
pre-Revolutionary conceptions of constitutional law.77 
On the normative front, popular constitutionalism produces at least two 
purported benefits: enhanced legitimacy and a greater capacity for ongoing 
self-definition.78 First, according to Post and Siegel, it generates greater "fidel-
ity to constitutional values."79 The People "expect their own constitutional 
beliefs to matter," 80 and the Constitution sustains its "legitimacy and author-
ity"81 by incorporating "the quintessentially democratic attitude in which citi-
zens know themselves as authorities, as authors of their own law."82 
Second, popular constitutionalism advances a distinctive vision of the Consti-
tution's role in developing a contemporary national identity. The Constitution 
calls "into being a regime of republican self-government"83 in which "constitu-
tional understandings and commitments can be challenged, reinterpreted, and 
renewed."84 Rather than undermining a series of precommitments to core 
values, the intersection of law and politics within the interpretive process allows 
the Constitution to serve as "an expression of [our] deepest beliefs and convic-
tions," and a reflection of the current "political self-conception of the nation."85 
Within this broad normative framework, popular constitutionalists are far 
from a monolithic force,86 and their work reflects a major descriptive rift in 
present-day constitutional interpretation over the division of interpretive power 
between t.lie People and the Court. One camp-Lhe "policentrists"87 -see the 
enhanced its legitimacy, and increased its power in our polity." Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 18, at 
505. 
77. In Kramer's account, the People offered interpretations about the constitutionality of state action 
through petitioning, protests, voting, "mobbing," and popular pressure on local law enforcement 
authorities. While these actions predate the adoption of the Constitution, Kramer argues that pre-
Revolutionary constitutionalism was based on a "customary constitution" that was based upon the 
consent of the governed and had its origins in English legal culture and practice. See Kramer, We the 
Court, supra note 16, at 16-33. Further, Kramer sees popular constitutionalism as entirely consistent 
with constitutional law's traditional status as "a special form of popular law" that is fundamentally 
different from statutory or common law. See id. at 10. 
78. I acknowledge here that, for constitutional theorists, the divide between descriptive and norma-
tive argument is often difficult, if not impossible, to discern. See Barry Friedman, The Counter-
Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 933, 934 
(2001). What follows is an attempt to dissect these elements from a body of literature that is often less 
than explicit about distinguishing between descriptive observations and normative assertions. 
79. Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 1983. 
80. Id. at 1982. 
81. Id. at 1952. 
82. Id. at 1982. 
83. Kramer, We the Court, supra note 16, at 165. 
84. Id. at 15. 
85. Post, supra note 14, at 36-37. 
86. For efforts to describe the different strands of popular constitutionalist scholarship, see generally 
KRAMER, POPULAR CoNSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 16; James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without 
Judicial Supremacy: Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1377, 
1378-80 (2005). 
87. Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 1946. I use this term somewhat differently from Post and Siegel, 
who use it to describe those espousing a model of Section Five power that "attributes equal interpretive 
authority to both the Congress and to the Court." Id. 
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Rehnquist Court as a poor autobiographer, its perspective skewed by the failure 
to acknowledge both the historic interrelationship between law and politics and 
the role of popular mobilizations in the development of constitutional law. For 
policentrists, the nation is awash in popular interpretive preferences advanced 
through a range of political activity, with American constitutional discourse 
emerging as a vibrant and multi voiced contact sport. 88 The Court finds itself 
immersed in a cacophonous mass of popular and institutional interpretive 
expression, where constitutional meanings are contested and redefined in a 
conversation that involves the Court and many other players. 89 This input is 
then "incorporated into the warp and woof of constitutional law,"90 as political 
institutions-including the Court-act in ways that show their popular account-
ability. 
Post, for example, describes the Court's 2002-03 term as deeply intertwined 
with the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors. In recent decisions upholding 
affirmative action and overturning state sodomy laws, "the Court has shaped the 
substance of constitutional law to meet the demands of a dialectical relationship 
to constitutional culture."91 Specifically, he portrays the Court's recent sodomy 
decision in Lawrence as an "opening bid" in a larger dialogue between the 
Court and the People about the constitutional status of gay people, with the 
Court giving itself room to respond to the larger political consequences of its 
decision.92 
The second camp--the "juridominants"--desire an increased role for the 
People, but are somewhat more skeptical about the role of extrajudicial interpre-
tation in contemporary America. They view judicial supremacy as a largely 
accepted, if normatively flawed,93 premise, and see the Rehnquist Court's 
"power grab" for supremacy as the historical apex of judicial power. 94 As 
Kramer and others note, most Americans believe that the Court has the final say 
in what the Constitution means.95 Judicial power receives reinforcement from 
numerous sources, including the popular media,96 a public that takes the Court's 
88. See Powe, supra note 29, at 866-83 (outlining seven examples of postwar popular constitutional-
ism, and concluding that "popular constitutionalism appears to be alive and well"). 
89. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 653-54 (1993). 
Robert Cover describes courts as performing a "jurispathic" function, suppressing multiple interpretive 
visions that arise out of a process of "jurisgenesis." See Cover, supra note 9, at 11, 40-44. 
90. Post, supra note 14, at 8. 
91. Id. at 105. 
92. Id. at 104. 
93. See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 15, at 257--66. 
94. See Kramer, We the Court, supra note 16, at 168. 
95. MICHAEL x. DELLI CARPINI & Scorr KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNow ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT 
MATTERS 72 (1996); KRAMER, supra note 13, at 232; Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutional-
ism, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2596, 2621 (2003); Samuel L. Popkin & Michael A. Dimock, Political 
Knowledge and Citizen Competence, in CITIZEN COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 117, 126 
(Stephen L. Elkin & Karol Edward Soltan eds., 1999) (presenting 1994 study finding that 67.3% of 
people think the Supreme Court has "the final responsibility to decide if a law is constitutional or not"). 
96. Whittington, supra note 20, at 777 n.20. 
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supreme interpretive authority for granted,97 and a legal-academic culture that 
inculcates the narrative in future generations of political elites.98 Academic 
specialization helps too, by keeping political scientists and legal scholars operat-
ing in relative isolation.99 
From this vantage point, the People's interpretive aspirations are sublimated 
by a cultural consensus about the Court's departmental role. And in response, 
critics, whether driven by a normative agenda or by outright frustration with the 
Court's current composition, 100 have developed various schemes to challenge 
judicial supremacy, either through structural change, overt extrajudicial chal-
lenges to existing constitutional norms, 101 or the elimination of judicial re-
view.102 
Both camps leave a series of critical questions about the People's interpretive 
role unanswered. For example, popular constitutionalists are-almost to a 
person-completely silent about what their theories demand from individual 
citizens in order to operate effectively. Does popular constitutionalism need, for 
example, a certain level of political participation in order to legitimize interpre-
tive preferences or promote a national conversation about constitutional values? 
Are present levels of participation sufficient to achieve these normative goals, 
and if so, how can we tell? Should we care whether the participants accurately 
represent the entire polity? Does the theory require citizens to attain some 
minimum level of constitutional expertise to develop meaningful interpretive 
preferences? And, if so, what does a citizen need to be knowledgeable about? 
The constitutional text? The actions of their elected representatives? The Su-
preme Court? Do interpretive acts by popularly accountable branches actually 
confer greater legitimacy? 
Political scientists spend a lot of time worrying about these sorts of questions, 
and their findings present challenges for both camps. For juridominant scholars 
who seek a greater role for the People in interpretive discourse, apathy and 
ignorance present concrete obstacles to aspirations for greater popular involve-
ment in constitutional culture. For the policentrists, the People's perceptions 
about democratic institutions and processes call into question popular constitu-
97. Id. at 777 n.21. 
98. Id. at 777. As Barry Friedman recounts, academic "obsession" with judging and judicial review 
is a pathology that derives from now-distant historical events. The dialogue began during the Progres-
sive Era, when the Court's efforts to strike down popular economic legislation raised concerns about the 
countermajoritarian nature of judicial review. Generations of academic inculcation have kept the eyes 
of constitutional scholars focused squarely on the courts, despite the massive expansion of executive 
power, the growth of the administrative state, the rise of social movements, and a host of other 
historical trends that had the potential to reframe--or at least expand-the institutional focus of 
constitutional theory. See Friedman, History, Part Five, supra note 40, at 156. 
99. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1314 (2002) (noting lack of 
interdisciplinary work in constitutional scholarship). 
JOO. See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CAL. 
L. REv. 1013, 1023 (2004). 
IOI. See KRAMER, supra note 13, at 249. 
102. See generally TusHNET, supra note 23. 
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tionalism's ability to confer legitimacy on interpretive outcomes. Finally, from a 
descriptive perspective, popular constitutionalism often operates in ways that 
enhance the role of nonjudicial elites in the interpretive process, rather than 
incorporating the voice of individual citizens. 
II. NOSTALGIA AND THE GENERATIONAL DIVIDE 
It is hard not to admire policentric visions of American political life. In this 
alternate universe, civic engagement is high, social movements motivate a 
larger evolution of constitutional values, and political institutions respond to 
mobilization around constitutional issues. Juridominant aspirations also have 
significant appeal. In this hypothetical world, the People and their political 
institutions are empowered to challenge concentrations of interpretive power, 
and accept greater responsibility for resolving core disputes about constitutional 
meaning. Indeed, it is easy to see how constitutional scholars whose politically 
formative years occurred amidst the progressive social activism of the 1960s 
and 1970s would tell these stories and revere their protagonists. 103 
Yet this is not the America I k:now. 104 
To children of the post-Watergate era whose formative years occurred amidst 
widespread political apathy and ignorance, unprecedented amounts of money 
entering the political process, and the political mobilization of the religious 
right, popular constitutionalism seems nostalgic: "A collective dream that facili-
tates a primitive exchange of sentiments, while inhibiting a realistic appraisal of 
contemporary social relations." 105 
In reading the popular constitutionalists' work, I am drawn back to a conversa-
tion with my grandmother many years ago, listening to her describe a baseball 
game at Ebbett's Field in Brooklyn. Her vision is idyllic: it's a day game, the 
sky is blue, and the grass is perfectly groomed. The park itself is intimate, and 
there is a strong sense of spirit and community among the fans. In her 
recollection, the players exhibit a childlike love of the game, almost glowing in 
an aura of innocence. Her story is rich with history and emotion, a testimonial 
to a finer and more intimate time. 
Looking back now, her vision-real or imagined-might as well have oc-
curred on another planet. The games I attend are still fun, but somehow more 
complex and tarnished. Words like free agency and salary cap and steroids are 
103. See, e.g., M. Kent Jennings, Residues of a Movement: The Aging of the American Protest 
Generation, 81 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 367, 381 (1987) ("Among more politicized, passionate, and skillful 
sub-populations ... the residues of the formative experience may be strong indeed."). 
104. I recognize it is somewhat unusual to insert a personal perspective into a theoretical piece. 
Here, however, I take to heart Jack Balkin's admonition that constitutional theory-at least for the 
constitutional theorist-begins at home. See Balkin, supra note 36, at 1952. Subjective factors and 
contextual dynamics in the theorist's life can and do influence the critic's perspective. 
105. Fabio B. DaSilva & Jim Faught, Nostalgia: A Sphere and Process of Contemporary Ideology, 5 
QUALITATIVE Soc. 47, 49 (1982). While the term nostalgia was originally used to describe homesick-
ness, today it connotes "a longing for something far away and long ago." David S. Werman, Nonna/ 
and Pathological Nostalgia, 25 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC Ass'N 387, 387-88 (1977). 
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on people's lips, and many fans are on the road by the seventh inning to beat the 
traffic. While her story says a lot about history and aspiration, it says very little 
about either the game today or my experience at the ballpark, other than a 
lingering sense of longing for a golden age long past. 
In time, nostalgia must give way to reality. While constitutional theorists 
have looked to the past by focusing on historical moments of popular mobiliza-
tion, 106 contemporary political scientists have been amassing data about how 
the American people perceive their government, their sense of civic responsibil-
ity, and their own capacity for self-governance. 
Their work presents a pessimistic vision for popular engagement in constitu-
tional interpretation, with a polity that bears only a distant relationship to the 
images of vibrant civic life that animate policentrist narratives. Far from 
prepared for the massive shift in interpretive responsibility that popular constitu-
tionalism entails, Americans are seen as increasingly turned off by politics and 
disengaged from civic life. Hence, the political scientists' work presents descrip-
tive challenges to policentric accounts of the People's relationship with politics, 
and operational challenges to juridominant calls for a popular constitutionalist 
regime to counteract the Court's interpretive supremacy. 
Popular constitutionalism's central theoretical premise is that citizens play an 
active role in the day-to-day business of constitutional interpretation outside of 
Article V. This occurs along two channels of communication. The first is 
through cultural expression and engagement. 107 A citizen who, for example, 
watches Will and Grace is a participant in a larger conversation about the legal 
status of lesbians and gay men in contemporary society. This dialogue engages 
constitutional culture by sending signals about social tolerance, stigma, equality, 
and other dynamics that contribute to the establishment and maintenance of 
constitutional norms. Its full exploration, however, is beyond our scope. 
The second, and primary, means for accessing constitutional culture is through 
traditional political channels. The citizen who sends messages along these 
participatory pathways becomes a "citizen-interpreter" whose perspective is 
integrated into the interpretive process. 
The citizen-interpreter engages the conversation about constitutional meaning 
in three distinct steps: preferences, participation, and legitimacy. For a citizen to 
engage with constitutional culture, she must first obtain information about, and 
then discern her preferences on, a given constitutional issue. Those preferences 
are, in tum, delivered into constitutional culture through one or more acts of 
political participation. Finally, the citizen-interpreter grants legitimacy through 
compliance with constitutional norms. 
For years, political scientists have been exploring all three areas, and their 
106. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
107. Post, supra note 14, at 8-9 (distinguishing between culture and constitutional culture). But see 
Balkin, supra note 36, at 1947-48 (suggesting that the distinction between "popular culture" and 
"democratic culture" is dependent upon the theorist's perspective). 
2005] POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND NOSTALGIA 913 
work presents some large pragmatic hurdles for popular constitutionalism. But 
empiricism, like any analytical lens, has its limitations. Questions of sample 
size, the phrasing of survey questions, data analysis, and methodology come 
with the territory. In reviewing the relevant literature, I do not mean to suggest 
that these snapshots reflect a perfectly accurate vision of contemporary Ameri-
can political life, or that the studies themselves are flawless. Instead, I am using 
their work to raise practical questions about both the feasibility and normative 
benefits of popular constitutionalism in contemporary America. 
Ill. APATHY AND IGNORANCE, OR, WHAT IF POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISTS THREW 
A REVOLUTION AND NOBODY CARED? 
Juridominants ask the People-either directly or through their representa-
tives-to initiate a new interpretive regime that directly challenges existing 
assumptions about the Court's role in defining constitutional meaning. As 
Kramer puts it, "[i]t means insisting that the Supreme Court is our servant and 
not our master: a servant whose seriousness and knowledge deserves much 
deference, but who is ultimately supposed to yield to our judgments about what 
the Constitution means and not the reverse." 108 Along with spawning a revolu-
tion in interpretive responsibility, the People and their elected representatives 
are asked to assume a new role in the interpretive process, one that requires a 
more active engagement with constitutional law and politics. 109 
Yet this collides with studies showing that the People have little interest in 
increased civic responsibility or greater popular accountability in politics. 110 In 
a recent book, political scientists John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse 
sought to document Americans' perceptions and feelings about their involve-
ment in the political process. They concluded that "[t]he last thing people want 
is to be more involved in political decisionmaking: They do not want to make 
political decisions themselves; they do not want to provide much input to those 
who are assigned to make these decisions; and they would rather not know all 
the details of the decision-making process." 111 
Their conclusions are backed up by numerous studies about political participa-
tion and knowledge that portray current political conditions as particularly 
inhospitable to a juridominant revolution in interpretive responsibility. If partici-
pation levels are any indication, exercising their interpretive influence is, at 
present, very low on the People's "to-do" list. And if levels of political 
knowledge are any indication, the People appear content to allow constitutional 
interpretation to exist largely off their radar screen. Moreover, these trends are 
108. KRAMER, supra note 13, at 248. 
109. See id. at 247-48; TusHNET, supra note 23, at 57-65 (suggesting that Congress's interpretive 
role is limited by the Court's interpretive dominance). 
110. The same might be said of Congress. See KRAMER, supra note 13, at 228. 
111. JoHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS' BELIEFS ABOUT 
How GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 1-2 (2002). 
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prevalent in contemporary American politics, and generational data suggest that 
they will remain in place for a long time to come. 
A. PARTICIPATION 
For the citizen-interpreter, political participation is the primary vehicle for 
accessing the communicative pathways across the law-politics divide. 112 Citi-
zens send interpretive messages into constitutional culture through a range of 
electoral and political acts, creating a dynamic system where participant demo-
graphics, methods of communication, levels of civic engagement, and responsive-
ness of political institutions to participatory input change over time. 113 
As the most common form of political participation, 114 voting plays a signifi-
cant role in any popular constitutionalist scheme. When interpretive power 
shifts from the exclusive province of the Court to political institutions that 
possess greater popular accountability, voting becomes the primary-though by 
no means the exclusive-vehicle for communicating popular interpretive prefer-
ences. 
Today, America is in the midst of a five-decade-long decline in voter turn-
out. 115 According to the Federal Election Commission, 63% of eligible voters 
cast a ballot in the 1960 presidential election. 116 By 2000-a closely contested 
election-the turnout percentage had fallen to 51 %. 117 The decline in nonpresi-
dential elections is equally stark, with 47% turnout in 1962118 falling to 36% in 
1998. 119 While there was a slight resurgence in interest during the mid-eighties 
and a major upsurge in turnout for the 2004 election, 120 the overall trend is 
stark: participation in Presidential elections has decreased by one-quarter over 
the past forty years, with roughly the same decline for off-year elections. 121 The 
decline extends to state and local elections. One study reported a 26% decrease 
112. I adopt here M. Margaret Conway's definition of political participation as "activities of citizens 
that attempt to influence the structure of government, the selection of government officials, or the 
policies of government." M. MARGARET CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN TIIE UNITED STATES 3 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
113. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at ch. 9; CONWAY, supra note 112, at 6-12. 
114. VERBA, ScHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 50. 
115. But see Michael P. McDonald & Samuel L. Popkin, The Myth of the Vanishing Voter, 95 AM. 
PoL. Sci. REv. 963, 963 (2001) (arguing that apparent decline in voter participation is an illusion created 
by using the "voting age population" instead of eligible voters to determine turnout rate). 
116. Federal Election Commission, National Voter Turnout in Federal Elections: 1960-1996, avail-
able at http://www.fec.gov/pages/htmlto5.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004). 
117. Federal Election Commission, Voter Registration and Turnout 2000, available at http:// 
www.fec.gov/pages/2000turnout/reg&to00.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004). 
118. Federal Election Commission, supra note 116. 
119. Federal Election Commission, Voter Registration and Turnout-1998, available at http:// 
www.fec.gov/pages/reg&to98.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004). 
120. See Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, President Bush, Mobilization Drives 
Propel Turnout to Post-1968 High; Kerry, Democratic Weakness Shown, at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/37992.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2005) (estimating a turnout of 59.6% of eligible voters). It 
remains to be seen whether the increase was a one-time event or indicative of a larger trend. 
121. PuTNAM, supra note 26, at 32. 
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between 1967 and 1987 in the number of people who say they "always vote in 
local elections." 122 
When compared both with other periods in American history and with other 
democracies, contemporary turnout is low. Between 1840 and 1900, for ex-
ample, turnout averaged 77.7%. 123 Reviewing the 1996 and 1998 elections, 
Robert Putnam concluded that it had been nearly two centuries "since so many 
American citizens freely abstained from voting." 124 Further, when compared 
with twenty other democracies, the United States ranks next to last (ahead of 
Switzerland), with the highest-ranked democracies (Belgium, Austria, and Aus-
tralia) sporting turnouts of 90% or more. 125 
The decline in electoral turnout has occurred despite tremendous strides in 
three areas that should have helped reverse the trend: increased access to 
education, decreased information costs, and the elimination of barriers to voter 
registration. 
Education is a strong predictor of electoral participation: well-educated people 
are more likely to be interested and well informed about politics 126 and more 
likely to cast a ballot. 127 As a result, one would expect that increased access to 
institutions of higher education would bring an increase in voter interest and 
activism. Instead, just the opposite has occurred. Despite increased levels of 
educational attainment, 128 electoral turnout continues to decline. 129 
Moreover, political scientists have long speculated that the costs of obtaining 
and analyzing political information contribute to voter disengagement. 130 The 
decision to vote involves an assessment of costs and benefits, both tangible and 
intangible. Among the significant costs voters take on is an investment of time 
and energy in obtaining and analyzing information about the candidates or the 
pressing issues of the day. While developments in information technology, 
marketing, and mass manufacturing have made information easier to come by, 
better targeted, and cheaper to obtain than ever before, these changes seem not 
to have affected the American electorate. 
Finally, access to the polls has never been greater. Since the 1960s, changes 
in voter registration systems have enhanced access to the franchise, including 
the abolition of poll taxes and literacy tests, the increased availability of 
122. VERBA, ScHLOZMAN, & BRADY, supra note 26, at 72. 
123. RUY A. TEIXEIRA, THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER 8 (1992). 
124. PuTNAM, supra note 26, at 33. 
125. Id. at 7; see also Arend Lijphart, Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma, 91 
AM. PoL. Sc1. REv. 1, 5 (1997) ("[T]he United States ranks near the bottom of voting participation in 
comparative perspective .... "). 
126. RAYMONDE. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VoTES? 19 tbl.2.2 (1980). 
127. NORMAN H. NIE, JANE JUNN & KENNETH STEHLIK-BARRY, EDUCATION AND DEMOCRATIC CmZENSHIP 
IN AMERICA 31 (1996). 
128. Id. at 114-15. 
129. VERBA, ScHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 74. 
130. See, e.g., The Process of Becoming lnfonned, ch. 11 of ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY 
OF DEMOCRACY ( 1957). 
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multilingual materials, the decline in state residency requirements, and the 
creation of national standards for absentee registration. 131 Yet, while the Federal 
Election Commission estimates that the Motor Voter Act has added at least ten 
million registered voters to the rolls since 1993, turnout dropped by five million 
between 1992 and 2000. 132 
Voting is, of course, only one type of participation. The People assert their 
interpretive preferences through numerous other mechanisms, including work 
on political campaigns, writing letters to elected officials, donating money to 
campaigns or causes, running for public office, protesting, attending town 
meetings, or joining organizations that advance a particular viewpoint or agenda. 
These other types of participation are particularly critical for citizen-
interpreters who seek to influence constitutional culture. First, they are "informa-
tion-rich" activities. 133 While it is difficult to use one's vote to send a specific 
message beyond a preference for one candidate over another, other forms of 
participation allow a participant to target a specific interpretive message to a 
specific institutional or popular audience. 134 Second, these other activities allow 
participants to express the intensity of their preference, and to enjoy the 
increased responsiveness that comes from a greater volume of participation. 135 
While a voter can only vote once, the resources a motivated individual can give 
to other participatory activities are relatively unconstrained. Compared with 
other forms of participation, voting is "a rather blunt instrument for the commu-
nication of information about the needs and preferences of citizens." 136 
Robert Putnam, reviewing monthly polling results from 1973 to 1994 involv-
ing 410,000 respondents, found an across-the-board decline in almost every 
form of political participation. 137 In the 1990s, Americans were about half as 
likely to work for a political party or attend a political rally as they were in the 
1970s. 138 Over the period of the survey, the number of office seekers declined 
by 15%, and attendance at public meetings on town or school affairs declined 
by 40%. Putnam also reported significant decreases in the number of people 
who report signing a petition or writing a letter to Congress, 139 and a one-third 
increase in the number of Americans who do not engage in any form of civic 
131. TEIXEIRA, supra note 123, at 29. 
132. THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE VANISHING VOTER: Pueuc INVOLVEMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 8 
(2002). 




137. PuTNAM, supra note 26, at 420. 
138. Id. at 41. 
139. Id. at 45 tbl. l (noting a 23% decline in writing a letter to Congress and a 22% decline in 
signing a petition); see also RosENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 63 (reporting a decline in 
Congressional letter writing between 1973 and 1990). But see VERBA, SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 
26, at 73 (reporting increase in Congressional mail). See PumAM, supra note 26, at 449 nn.29-30 for an 
explanation of the discrepancy. 
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participation. 140 
Not surprisingly, interest in politics has declined alongside participation. 
National surveys reflect that the number of Americans who reported discussing 
politics "within the last week" fell from 51 % in 1980 to 28% in 1996, 14 I and the 
number who assert that they are "interested in politics" fell from 52% in 1975 to 
42% in 1999. 142 The number reporting a "good deal of interest" in current 
events fell from 50% in 1974 to 38% in 1998. I43 Political conversations among 
high school students were about half as common in the late 1990s as they were 
thirty years earlier. 144 
While there is no shortage of explanations for participatory decline, 145 there 
is a significant body of evidence pointing to "generational replacement"-the 
replacement of engaged older citizens by younger, more apathetic citizens-as a 
primary factor. I46 This "generation gap in civic engagement," driven by the 
increased role of baby boomers and their children, has driven turnout steadily 
downward. I47 Civic disengagement is concentrated in younger age cohorts, who 
are far less likely to write to members of Congress, sign petitions, work for 
political parties, or engage in any civic activity than their parents were at the 
same age. I48 This presents major challenges for reversing current trends, as 
younger cohorts begin to dominate the pool of eligible civic participants. 
B. KNOWLEDGE 
Time and attention are limited resources. As a result, citizens must make 
deliberate choices about what to focus on and gather information about. I49 In 
140. PlrrNAM, supra note 26, at 44. 
141. Id. at448 n.13. 
142. Id. The data are derived from the DOB Needham Life Style survey, conducted every year from 
1975 with an annual sample of 3500-4500. Id. at 420. 
143. Id. at 448 n.13. The data are derived from the Roper organization, which conducted an annual 
survey from September 1973 to October 1994 with approximately 2000 voting-age participants a year. 
Id. at 420. 
144. Id. at 260. 
145. The research in this area reaches a wide range of conclusions. See, e.g., DowNs, supra note 130, 
tbl.4.2 (rational voter behavior); FRANCES Fox PlVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T 
VOTE 260 (1988) (restrictive voter registration Jaws); PlrrNAM, supra note 26, at 260 (declin.ing social 
connectedness); RosENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 26 at 162 (declining role of political parties in 
mobilizing voters); VERBA, SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 129 (presenting a diverse list of 
reasons given in response to a survey, with "not enough time" and "taking care of myself and family" 
both polling slightly over one-third of respondents); Paul R. Abramson & John H. Aldrich, The Decline 
of Electoral Panicipation in the United States, 76 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 502-21 (1982) (weakening party 
affiliations and a declining sense of government responsiveness); Popkin & Dimock, supra note 95, at 
142 (lack of political knowledge). 
146. WARREN E. MILLER & J. MERRILL SHANKS, THE NEW AMERICAN VOTER 69 (1996). 
147. PlrrNAM, supra note 26, at 34. 
148. Id. at 252; see also William A. Galston, Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic 
Education, 4 ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 217, 219 (2001) (revealing that in early 1970s, about half of 
18-to-29-year-olds voted in presidential elections, compared with fewer than one-third in 1996). 
149. See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN 
WHAT THEY NEED To KNOW? 22 ( 1998). 
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the highly competitive market for our awareness, politics generally, and constitu-
tional law specifically, occupies an extremely limited place in our collective 
consciousness. 
General political knowledge exists along a continuum, with a "high variance 
in political awareness around a generally low mean." 150 At one end is a small 
but influential minority of well-informed citizens who are highly engaged with 
the political process. 151 At the other end is a much larger minority of "know 
nothings." 152 Ilya Somin, analyzing National Election Study data collected 
during the 2000 Presidential election, recently found that somewhere between 
25% and 35% of Americans have virtually no political knowledge at all. 153 
Most Americans fall in between the two extremes, but even within this 
middle group average knowledge levels are quite low. Somin concluded, echo-
ing numerous previous studies, 154 that Americans possess a low level of basic 
political knowledge. 155 For example, only 15% were able to successfully name 
at least one candidate for the House of Representatives in their own district, and 
only 11 % were able to identify the post held by William Rehnquist. 156 On 
political issues with constitutional implications, voters were operating on shaky 
ground: only 46% of respondents knew that Gore was more supportive of 
abortion rights than Bush, and only 51 % identified Gore as more supportive of 
gun control. 157 
Moreover, in a disturbing sign for the future, 158 political ignorance is growing 
among younger age cohorts: comparing voter knowledge in survey data from 
1989 with Gallup polls from the 1940s and 1950s, Delli Carpini and Keeter 
found that the knowledge gap between 18-to-29-year-olds and older cohorts is 
"substantially greater" now than it was then. 159 According to Putnam, about half 
150. foHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 18 (1992). 
151. Id. at 16; Stephen Earl Bennett, "Know-Nothings" Revisited: The Meaning of Political 
Ignorance Today, 69 Soc. Sci. Q. 476, 482 (1988). There is a strong correlation between political 
knowledge and participation. In the 1988 presidential election, for example, among the most knowledge-
able ten percent in Delli Carpini and Keeter's surveys, nine out of ten voted. By contrast, among the 
least informed ten percent, only two in ten went to the polls. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 95, at 
224. 
152. Bennett, supra note 151, at 482. 
153. Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on 
the "Central Obsession" of Constitutional Theory, 87 IOWA L. REv. 1287, 1313 (2004). 
154. See, e.g., DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 95, at 62-104 (reviewing studies on Americans' 
low level of political knowledge); ZALLER, supra note 150, at 18 (same); Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance 
and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REv. 413, 416-20 (1998) (same). 
155. Somin, supra note 153, at 1308 tbl.l. Somin analyzes data collected during the 2000 National 
Election Study. His survey items focus on different types of political knowledge, including specific 
policy issues, positions taken by major candidates, and facts about major political figures. See id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. See M. Kent Jennings, Political Knowledge over Time and Across Generations, 60 PUB. OPINION 
Q. 228, 249 (1996) (concluding that political knowledge among a particular age cohort remains stable 
over time across the life cycle). 
159. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 95, at 172. The data are derived from the 1989 Survey of 
Political Knowledge, which involved telephone interviews with 610 randomly selected adults. The 
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as many college freshmen as thirty years ago describe themselves as keeping up 
to date with politics. 160 
While popular constitutionalists have remained largely silent on the minimum 
level of knowledge needed to meaningfully participate in constitutional culture, 
the bar must, by necessity, be quite low. While there is a lack of current data on 
basic constitutional literacy, Delli Carpini and Keeter culled data from a range 
of more general national surveys conducted between 1940 and 1994. 
The results, limited as they are, vary based on the level of generality. On the 
positive side, a large majority of survey participants in the mid-l 980s knew that 
the Constitution was subject to amendment, that it contained a right to a trial by 
jury, that states could institute the death penalty, and that the First Amendment 
protected rights related to free speech and the press. 161 Further, younger age 
cohorts appeared more knowledgeable about constitutional issues than older 
ones. 162 
But as the questions became more detailed, constitutional literacy predictably 
declined. Just over half were able to identify the number of women on the 
Supreme Court. 163 Between a quarter and a half of people asked could describe 
the decisions reached in three highly salient decisions: Miranda v. Arizona, Roe 
v. Wade, and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 164 Less than one-quarter 
were able to identify more than one right protected by the First or Fifth 
Amendments, could name all three branches of government, or knew that the 
Supreme Court did not automatically review all federal lower-court deci-
sions.165 
Even in moments when public attention is focused on interpretive develop-
ments, constitutional culture operates on the fringes of popular conscious-
ness.166 In a study conducted after the Court issued a major 1989 abortion 
decision, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, only about 50% of the public 
knew anything about the decision, declining to 35% several weeks after the 
pollsters asked questions substantially similar to those asked during Gallup polls in the 1940s and 
1950s.ld.at 163,291-93. 
160. PlrrNAM, supra note 26, at 260. 
161. The surveys revealed that 76% knew the constitution could be amended (1986), 83% knew the 
right to a jury trial was guaranteed (1986), 83% knew the states could institute the death penalty (1983), 
and 75% correctly identified the First Amendment rights. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 95, at 
70-71. 
162. Id. at 203. 
163. In 1988, 53% of survey participants answered this question correctly. Id. at 70. 
164. Forty-five percent of survey participants identified the substance of the Miranda decision 
(1989), 30% identified Roe (1986), and 29% identified Webster (1989). Id. See Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966). 
165. Only 20% were able to name two First Amendment rights, and only 2% two Fifth Amendment 
rights (1989). Id. at 71. Only 12% knew that the Supreme Court did not review all federal cases (1986), 
and 19% were able to name the three branches of government ( 1952). Id. at 71. 
166. See Friedman, supra note 95, at 2623 ("Only a small fraction of the Supreme Court's work is 
likely to be salient with the public."). 
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decision. 167 Webster, though, is aberrational in its ability to command compara-
tively high levels of public attention. 168 In general, large segments of the public 
are essentially ignorant about the Court and its work. 169 This is no surprise, 
given that the Court enjoys significantly less media coverage than other branches 
of government, 170 and what is reported omits much of what the Court does. 171 
In sum, current levels of knowledge and participation suggest, as Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse put it, that "the people's desire to avoid politics is widespread." 172 
Large numbers of Americans deliberately opt out of the process, choosing to 
spend their time on other pursuits. If popular constitutionalists intend to place 
increased civic responsibility in the hands of individual citizens-either to 
initiate a shift toward greater popular accountability or to actively integrate their 
preferences into the interpretive process-they must reckon with the fact that 
the People seem to want less, not more, involvement in civic life. These are 
sub-optimal conditions for juridominant scholars seeking to launch an interpre-
tive revolution, particularly if the People are expected to play an active role in 
provoking a change in interpretive regimes. 
Indeed, in such an environment, the People are likely to prefer interpretive 
processes that make minimal demands on their time and attention. Judicial 
supremacy, in turn, begins to look increasingly attractive to the average Joe. 
Under a juricentric regime, the People avoid the increased transaction costs that 
come with greater control over interpretive outcomes: obtaining and analyzing 
interpretive information, prioritizing and communicating preferences, monitor-
167. ZALLER, supra note 150, at 17-18. 
168. Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Media, Knowledge, and Public Evaluations of the 
Supreme Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 352, 364, 366 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995). 
169. See id. at 369; see also Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse nor the Sword: Dynamics of 
Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80 AM. PoL. Ser. REV. 1209, 1211 (1986) ("Few members of 
the public, regardless of the place or time of the sample, fulfill the most minimal prerequisites of the 
role of a knowledgeable and competent citizen vis-a-vis the Court."). But see Valerie J. Hoekstra, The 
Supreme Court and Local Public Opinion, 94 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 89, 90, 97 (2000) (criticizing 
methodology of surveys examining public knowledge about the Court); James L. Gibson, Gregory A. 
Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Public Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 2001, at 4 (2001) 
(unpublished manuscript) available at http://artsci.wustl.edu/-Iegit/Courtknowledge.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2004) (concluding that Americans have a "surprisingly high" level of information about the 
Court, based on surveys conducted after the 2000 election controversy). 
170. See Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 168, at 357 (finding that the President and Congress receive, 
respectively, 8.3 and 4.1 times as much coverage as the Court). But see Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact 
of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32, 38 
(2001) (finding "clear" but "not dramatic" increases in knowledge about the Court due to heightened 
media coverage around Bush v. Gore). 
Knowledge about the Court and its workings is, of course, distinct from knowledge about constitu-
tional values, constitutional procedures, or other aspects of constitutional discourse. However, for the 
majority of Americans, who assume the Court's interpretive supremacy, see supra note 95, knowledge 
of the Court and of the Constitution are often one and the same. 
171. Jerome O'Callaghan & James 0. Dukes, Media Coverage of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 69 
JoURNALISM Q. 195, 203 (1992) (concluding that "the media frequently neglect the Court's contribution 
to the development of many diverse areas of American law") . 
. 172. HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 111, at 3. 
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ing political agents to ensure that their behavior complies with desired out-
comes, and the psycho-emotional costs of bringing constitutional issues, 
previously addressed within the highly circumscribed rules of the courtroom, 
into a more overtly contentious political context. 
Instead, unelected judges incur the costs of obtaining information, determin-
ing its relevance, analyzing it, developing a conclusion, and implementing an 
interpretive vision. Court hierarchies and the appointments process absorb the 
agency costs of monitoring interpretive developments. And, with limited oppor-
tunity for interpretive input, the People are free to allocate their time and energy 
to other pursuits. 
IV. POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES 
The Court's recent assertion of interpretive power has caused significant 
distress among popular constitutionalists; they have not been shy about calling 
on the People and other political institutions to take action. 173 Yet the Court's 
"grab for power"174 may reflect a broader consensus about how our society 
should resolve interpretive problems. This consensus de-emphasizes the voice 
of ordinary people in favor of processes and institutional actors that maintain an 
appearance of neutrality and eschew overt conflict. 
Policentrists posit an interpretive process where norms are reached through 
multiple actors and a mixture of political and legal procedures. The process 
results in interpretive outcomes that are "grounded in the constitutional culture 
of the nation," which is, in tum, "essential to constitutional legitimacy."175 
While policentrists avoid specifics about what their models demand from 
individual citizens, they implicitly address concerns about low levels of civic 
engagement through representative delegation, often treating Congress or inter-
est groups as tantamount to "the People." Post and Siegel, for example, offer a 
"legislative constitutionalism" model, where Congress serves as the primary 
(but not exclusive) vehicle for communicating popular interpretive preferences, 
often acting through Section Five legislation in response to social movements or 
interest groups. 176 Democratic accountability thus allows Congress to "elicit 
and articulate the nation's evolving interpretive aspirations,"177 which, in tum, 
legitimizes interpretive outputs. 
173. See KRAMER, supra note 13, at 247 ("[T]o control the Supreme Court, we must first lay claim to 
the Constitution ourselves."); Post & Siegel, supra note 43, at 45 (telling Congress it "must act to 
protect the Constitution for the people," which means publicly repudiating Justices who say that they 
possess exclusive authority to say what the Constitution means). 
174. Kramer, We the Court, supra note 16, at 169. 
175. Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 2059. While Post and Siegel do not offer any definition of 
"legitimacy," I assume they are using the term in a positive sense, in which an interpretive regime "is 
legitimate if people comply with its laws and cooperate in social undertakings as a matter of acceptance 
rather than just of coerced obedience." RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 207 
(2003). 
176. Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 2026-32. 
177. Id. at 2031. 
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Yet there is little indication that the People have much faith in the ability of 
Congress or interest groups to serve as their interpretive agents. In a 1998 
Gallup survey, 67% of respondents felt interest groups had "[t]oo much power," 
outpolling even the federal government. 178 As for Congress, it consistently 
enjoys much lower levels of public confidence and approval than either the 
judiciary or the executive branch. 179 Large majorities perceive Congress as "too 
heavily influenced by interest groups in making decisions," and "too far re-
moved from ordinary people." 180 
The Court, on the other hand, maintains comparatively high levels of public 
support. 181 The reasons for favorable attitudes toward the Court are somewhat 
unclear. Some legal scholars attribute it to the Court's adaptability and respon-
siveness to political trends and social movements; 182 others explain it by 
pointing to the almost "mythic" qualities many Americans associate with the 
institution. 183 
Within political science, a recent and growing body of research points to 
process, rather than outcomes, as the driving force behind the Court's relative 
popularity. As Tom Tyler notes, "procedural justice influences are strong when 
the focus of attention is citizen evaluations of national political and legal 
authorities." 184 
Tyler's research looked at the relative weight of different factors in assessing 
the fairness of the Court's procedures. He concluded that assessments of 
neutrality and the trustworthiness of the Justices' motives were major compo-
178. HIBBING & THEiss-MoRSE, supra note Ill, at 102. The poll involved a sample of 1266 
respondents. Id. at 246. 
179. Id. at 99; see also JoHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PuBLIC ENEMY 32 
(1995) (documenting confidence levels from 1971-1994). 
180. HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 179, at 64. 
181. Id. at 54; Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the 
Supreme Coun, 36 AM. J. POL. Sc1. 635, 635 (1992) ("[T]he Supreme Court has traditionally fared well 
in the estimations of the public, especially in comparison with other political institutions."); James L. 
Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States 
Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 354, 360 (2003); Jeffery J. Mondak & Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, 
The Dynamics of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 59 J. POL. ll l 4, ll 18 (1997) (tracking support 
from 1972-1994); Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr., David J. Houston & Chris Sissie Hadjiharalambous, 
Public Confidence in the Leaders of American Governmental Institutions, in WHAT Is IT ABOITT 
GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 83, 83-84, 93-96 (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse 
eds., 2001); John M. Scheb & William Lyons, Public Perception of the Supreme Coun in the 1990s, 82 
JUDICATURE 67 (1998) (finding respondents almost twice as likely to rate the Court "good" or 
"excellent" than to similarly rate Congress); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the 
Empowennent of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Coun and Abonion 
Rights, 43 DuKE L.J. 703, 744 (1994). 
182. See supra note 76. 
183. See, e.g., Dean Jaros & Robert Roper, The U.S. Supreme Court: Myth, Diffuse Support, Specific 
Support, and Legitimacy, 8 AM. POL. Q. 85, 95 (1980) (finding "high degree of mythical belief about 
the Supreme Court" among subjects attending state universities). 
184. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Public Dissatisfaction with Government, in WHAT Is IT ABOITT 
GovERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE?, supra note 181, at 227, 236. 
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nents of the public's comparatively favorable view of the Court. I85 More 
significantly for popular constitutionalists, he found that the public's inability to 
influence the Court's decisions--0r lack of popular accountability-had "no 
influence upon procedural fairness judgments."I 86 
Tyler's findings reflect other studies that examine Americans' notions of 
procedural justice and how they affect perceptions of political institutions. 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue that public distaste for the prolonged and often 
contentious deliberative processes that dominate legislative decisionmaking 
schemes is a major factor in Congress's low public opinion ratings compared 
with other political institutions. I87 This is consistent with social science re-
search documenting the People's preference for avoiding conflict, and their 
perception that animosity and public conflict violate shared social norms. I 88 
Moreover, there is significant ambivalence about processes such as compromise 
and deliberation that are essential to the legislative process. Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse note a 1998 Gallup survey where 86% of respondents agreed that 
"elected officials should stop talking and take action," and 60% agreed that 
"compromise is selling out one's principles."I 89 
In such a context, it is no surprise that the Court enjoys enhanced popular 
legitimacy. I9° Compared with the heated and contentious rhetoric that often 
accompanies national elections and Congressional debate, it operates as a model 
of civility. Its decisionmaking procedures are highly circumscribed, with most 
debate and horse trading taking place behind closed doors. Norms of profes-
sional courtesy and decorum are well established. 
There are at least four other reasons to doubt the policentrist assertion that 
"democratic accountability" necessarily produces more legitimate interpretive 
outcomes. First, a significant segment of the population is skeptical about the 
virtues of democratic accountability. In one recent survey, almost half of the 
respondents agreed that the political system would be better if "decision making 
were left to successful business people" or "non-elected experts."I91 This 
reflects, in part, the People's ambivalence about their own trustworthiness and 
capacity for fairness, 192 as well as perceptions that elected officials use their 
office to advance their own self-interest. I93 Juricentric interpretation, by con-
trast, appeals to the sizeable portion of Americans that favors a more expert-
185. Id. at 239. 
186. Id. 
187. HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 179, at 147. 
188. See Carolyn L. Funk, Process Performance: Public Reaction to Legislative Policy Debate, in 
WHAT ls IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE?, supra note 181, at 193, 195, 198-201. 
189. HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 111, at 136. 
190. See Friedman, supra note 95, at 2616-17. 
191. HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 111, at 139. 
192. Id. at 113 (summarizing a 1998 Gallup survey showing 60% of respondents agreeing with 
statement that "you can't be too careful in dealing with people" and 52% agreeing that "most people 
would take advantage of you if they had the chance"). 
193. Id. at 122-24. 
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driven approach to governance. Moreover, despite sometimes vehement 
disagreement with interpretive outcomes, the Court's institutional support de-
rives, in part, from a belief that the justices are not making decisions to advance 
their own well-being. 194 
Second, when it comes to constitutional interpretation, another body of data 
suggests that the People show strong preferences toward the interpretive method-
ologies associated with judicial practice. Scheb and Lyons conclude that the 
"myth of legality"-that judicial decisions are based upon neutral processes of 
legal reasoning-is alive and well today. 195 The myth is particularly strong 
among well-educated people-those most likely to participate in politics and 
constitutional culture. 196 Furthermore, the language of law carries significant 
symbolic weight. In examining popular expectations for the basis of Supreme 
Court decisions, Scheb and Lyons found that people think original intent and 
precedent should play prominent roles, while partisanship and ideology-on 
relatively high display in the legislative arena-should have the least effect on 
the Court's decisionmaking. 197 
Third, to the extent that popular constitutionalism relies upon the involve-
ment of non-judicial political elites, contemporary political conditions suggest 
that their interpretive influence will move constitutional discourse in directions 
that are anything but "popular." The political opinions of elites, by and large, 
are significantly more polarized than the preferences of non-elite citizens. 198 If 
past practice is any indication, increased interpretive input by political elites 
will overrepresent the views of extreme ideologues, 199 and skew the interpretive 
agenda towards issues of limited significance to most Americans. 200 
Fourth, while popular constitutionalists often criticize other academics for 
their lack of faith in the interpretive and political abilities of ordinary citi-
zens,201 some of this skepticism is shared by the People themselves. Along with 
a lack of desire, there are also indications that Americans are increasingly 
skeptical of their own ability to participate in political life and effect political 
194. Id. at 158. 
195. John M. Scheb & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public Evaluation of the Supreme 
Court, 81 Soc. So. Q. 928, 928 (2000). 
196. Id. at 938. 
197. See John M. Scheb & William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and Public Opinion: Popular 
Expectations Regarding the Factors That Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23 PoL. BEHAV. 181, 
184-86 (2001). 
198. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY c. POPE, CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A 
POLARIZED AMERICA 114-18 (2005). 
199. Id. at 149-50. 
200. Id. at 152-53. 
201. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 13, at 244 ("Most contemporary commentators share a sensibility 
that takes for granted various unflattering stereotypes respecting the irrationality and manipulability of 
ordinary people ... ");PARKER, supra note 12, at 73 ("The conventional discourse of constitutional law 
breathes in the warm air of the academy, rises over the heads of many to whom it is supposedly 
addressed, and then sends down a subtle message of inadequacy to everyone who is not 'in the 
know."'). 
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change. Political scientists measure an individual's sense of their own capacity 
for self-governance by assessing their political efficacy. Efficacy comes in two 
types: internal efficacy (a sense of one's personal ability to understand politics) 
and external efficacy (a belief that one's political activities can influence 
politics).202 Efficacy is closely related to political participation, as individuals 
with higher levels of efficacy are more likely to engage in a range of participa-
tory activities, from voting to donating money.203 
Rosenstone and Hansen, examining data from 1952 to 1990, found that 
Americans' sense of internal efficacy is declining. Between 1960 and 1988, the 
percentage of the electorate who rejected the statement that "politics and 
government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand 
what's going on" fell from 41%to22%.204 
Their data reveal similar results for external efficacy. From 1960 to 1988, the 
number of Americans who disagreed with the idea that "people like me don't 
have any say in what the government does" fell from 73% to 55%. Over the 
same period, the number who rejected the notion that public officials "don't ... 
care much about what people like me think" fell from 75% to 43%.205 
These dynamics are only exacerbated when constitutional interpretation is the 
participatory act in question. While there is little empirical data about Ameri-
cans' beliefs in their own ability to interpret the Constitution or to affect others' 
interpretations, we can guess that interpretive efficacy is in short supply. As 
Richard Parker points out, the specialized and elitist nature of constitutional 
discourse "has eroded the capacity of ordinary people to take part in . . . and 
even understand" constitutional arguments.206 
The impact of this literature is twofold. 
First, it adds to the body of data that portrays modern-day America as an 
inhospitable environment for popular constitutionalist schemes. Indeed, many 
citizens appear to prefer decisionmaking procedures that are relatively undemand-
ing, minimize public deliberation, employ legal vocabulary and reasoning, and 
are relatively insulated from the whim of public opinion. 
Second, there is reason to doubt whether "democratic accountability" actually 
enhances interpretive legitimacy. When asked to assess their own capacity to 
govern or Congress's institutional performance, the People respond with skepti-
cism. In this light, interpretive outcomes produced by judicial "experts," particu-
larly when combined with perceptions that the process is fair2°7 and insulated 
202. RosENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 15. 
203. Id. at 144-45. 
204. Id. at 144. 
205. Id. at 143-44. 
206. PARKER, supra note 12, at 72-73. 
207. See ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 104-08, 178 (1990) (establishing a connection 
between procedural justice, compliance, and legitimacy). But see James L. Gibson, Understandings of 
Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance, 23 LAW & Soc'y REv. 
469, 487 (1989) (arguing that compliance is based on notions of diffuse and specific support rather than 
perceptions of fairness). 
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from self-interest, may achieve greater legitimacy than an interpretive process 
with greater popular accountability. 
V. POPULISM, REPRESENTATION, AND ELITE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
When constitutional theorists talk about assigning interpretive responsibility, 
they rely upon a distinction between two highly polarized "sensibilities."208 On 
one side is what Parker calls the Populist perspective, which embraces "ener-
getic activity by ordinary people, and ... engagement with ordinary people, on 
a common level."209 Populists share a faith in an average citizen's ability to 
engage constitutional issues, and believe that popular involvement "is good for 
the vitality of all who take part in it, collectively as well as singly."210 On the 
other side is the "Anti-Populist" or "Progressive" perspective, which sees the 
People as too impulsive and ill-informed to engage in basic self-governance 
tasks. Anti-Populists prefer decisionmaking by calm, reasoned elites.211 
Popular constitutionalists associate judicial supremacy with Anti-Populism, 
seeing it as driven by a fear of popular power and biased assumptions about the 
People's capacity to govem.212 They, in tum, assign themselves the Populist 
label, and their narratives show the energy of ordinary people engaging constitu-
tional culture. Kramer, for example, cites popular protests and riots against the 
Jay Treaty, public meetings declaring the Alien and Sedition Acts null and void, 
and a constitutionally salient jury nullification as examples of popular constitu-
tionalism at the Founding.213 
Representative institutions are also filtered through the Populist lens. When 
Congress acts, it is in response to or in conjunction with popular activism, with 
legislators portrayed as agents of the People's interpretive will rather than 
Burkean trustees who impose their own interpretive visions.214 The People, in 
tum, do more than choose between competing leadership slates in periodic 
elections.215 Through social movement activism, they serve as the point of 
origin for and assessment of competing interpretive claims. In Post and Siegel's 
account of the women's movement, for example, Congress acted to pass 
constitutionally relevant legislation in response to a grassroots movement driven 
by the conversations among and participation of ordinary women.216 
These populist narratives serve to advance one of popular constitutionalism's 
208. KRAMER, supra note 13, at 241. 
209. PARKER, supra note 12, at 62. 
210. Id. 
211. 'KRAMER, supra note 13, at 242. 
212. Id. at 241-44. 
213. Id. at 3-5. 
214. For a description of Burke's theory of representation, see HIBBING & THE1ss-MoRSE, supra note 
111, at 41. 
215. This perspective on the People's role in democratic politics is often associated with Joseph 
Schumpeter and his landmark work, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942). See POSNER, supra 
note 175, at 178. 
216. See Post & Siegel, supra note 28, at 1986-96. 
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primary normative goals: to transform the Constitution from "a lawyer's con-
tract" to "a layman's instrument of govemment"217 through an interpretive 
process where the People engage in a collective and ongoing redefinition of 
national values. 218 In today's world, the People's increasingly distant relation-
ship with political life leads constitutional culture to operate in ways that are 
descriptively different from these moments of constitutional populism. 
Consider, for example, how most Americans convey their interpretive prefer-
ences. Today, protesting is a comparatively rare event for most citizens. A 1990 
survey of 2517 citizens found that only 6% had attended a protest within the 
past two years. By contrast, 71 % of the survey participants reported voting in 
the previous presidential election, and 24% reported donating money to a 
campaign.219 
Indeed, campaign contributions-a participatory act all but ignored by popu-
lar constitutionalists-appear to be the mechanism of choice for those who want 
to get their message heard. Today, a citizen who seeks to influence constitu-
tional culture is far more likely to write a check than take to the streets. 220 
While fewer and fewer Americans engage politics at a grassroots level (by 
attending political meetings or working for a political party), checkbook partici-
pation has exploded, growing from $35 million in 1964 to over $700 million in 
1996.221 Between 1967 and 1987, Verba, Scholzman and Brady found a 77% 
increase in the number of Americans who reported contributing money to a 
party or candidate.222 Currently, somewhere between 4% and 12% of registered 
voters donate money to federal campaigns. 223 Total spending on a single 
campaign increased to an all-time high of $717 million in the 2004 presidential 
election, more than ten times the $67 million spent in 1976.224 
Beyond the means of participation, limited participation and knowledge 
affect contemporary constitutional culture in at least two significant ways. First, 
low knowledge levels create an environment where the People's interpretive 
217. KRAMER, supra note 13, at 248 (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Constitution of the United 
States Was a Layman's Document, Not a Lawyer's Contract, Address on Constitution Day, Washington 
D.C. (Sept. 17, 1937), in l THE PuBuc PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 359, 362-63 
(Samuel I. Rosenman compiler and collator, 1941)); Post & Siegel, supra note 43, at 26 (same). 
218. See Balkin, supra note 36, at 1945-46 ("[P]opulism is based on a particular conception of 
self-rule and self-determination, one in which the active participation of the citizenry-when they 
choose to participate-is encouraged and facilitated."). 
219. VERBA, ScttLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 50-51. Self-reporting of political activity is 
often exaggerated in surveys. For an explanation, see id. at 50 n.2 and Somin, supra note 153, at 
1313 n.113. 
220. PlrrNAM, supra note 26, at 39-40 ("Financial capital ... has steadily replaced social capital ... 
as the coin of the realm."). 
221. Id. at 39. 
222. VERBA, SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 72. 
223. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYERS, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
31 (2002). 
224. Center for Responsive Politics, 2004 Presidential Election, at http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
presidential/index.asp?graph=spending (last visited Nov. 24, 2004). These figures are not adjusted for 
inflation. 
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input is often unstable and highly malleable. Second, participation in constitu-
tional culture is concentrated in ways that mirror larger power disparities in 
American life. 
The result is a constitutional conversation where the People's interpretive 
voice is left in the hands of an unrepresentative group of fairly well-off and 
well-educated citizens. This produces a constitutional culture that is highly 
susceptible to influence by political elites, with the political energy of ordinary 
people strategically channeled by elite opinion makers.225 
A. KNOWLEDGE, PUBLIC OPINION, AND ELITE DOMINATION 
In his recent book, Kramer dismisses the notion that there is some minimum 
level of moral or substantive expertise required for an individual citizen to 
contribute to constitutional culture. Constitutional law involves "hard questions, 
much too complicated to ever be solved or put to rest, regardless of the 
interpretive actor."226 Therefore, for example, knowledge about undue burdens, 
pregnancy trimesters, or what the Court has said about privacy and substantive 
due process are not prerequisites for the People to contribute meaningful 
interpretive input on the constitutionality of abortion. 
Regardless of the relative qualifications of judges and individual citizens, 
knowledge (or lack of it) plays a critical role in determining both the composi-
tion of and the outcomes produced by constitutional culture. Low knowledge 
levels leave many individuals excluded from the interpretive conversation, since 
the well-informed are more likely to engage in political participation.227 Knowl-
edgeable citizens are also more likely to have opinions, tend to be more stable 
in those opinions, and are better able to discount specific information that 
conflicts with larger values and belief systems.228 Conversely, those with low 
levels of political knowledge are less likely to participate or to have discemable 
political opinions. Moreover, the opinions they have are often internally inconsis-
tent and more easily subject to change.229 
As a result, high levels of ignorance often act to destabilize popular input into 
constitutional culture. For the large number of Americans who operate under 
conditions of low political awareness, individual opinions tend to be quite 
malleable.230 It is well known, for example, that responses to survey questions 
vary dramatically depending upon how a particular question is asked and the 
225. See FIORINA, ABRAMS & POPE, supra note 198, at 130. 
226. KRAMER, supra note 13, at 236. 
227. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 95, at 186-87. 
228. Id. at 230-35. 
229. Id. at 265. 
230. See HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 111, at 30-32; Philip E. Converse, The Nature of 
Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 206, 240 (David E. Apter ed., 1964) 
(presenting data showing high instability in public opinion on a range of policy issues over a two-year 
period). But see Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public and Beyond, in CITIZEN 
COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 95, at 93, 93 (arguing that Americans' collective 
policy preferences are real, measurable, and stable). 
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nature of the information provided. 231 They are also affected by contextual 
factors like the perceived degree of social conflict involved232 and the presenta-
tion of simple counterarguments.233 Indeed, many Americans simply hold no 
opinion at all, 234 possess significant ambivalence about the opinions they 
have, 235 or form their preferences through a process in which contradictory 
information is converted into an opinion based upon how recently the informa-
tion was acquired, rather than through employing a pre-existing set of values or 
deliberative reftection.236 
To explain how public opinion operates in these conditions, political scien-
tists place significant emphasis on the role of political elites-politicians, 
journalists, policy experts, certain activists-in opinion formation. 237 When 
individuals seek to learn about an area with which they have little familiarity, 
like the Constitution, they rely upon elites to provide relevant information, and 
to define salient issues and considerations.238 Individuals also look to elites as 
signaling devices, since the source of the information, rather than the content, 
often serves as a cue to help a citizen determine where he or she stands on a 
particular issue.239 
Lack of basic political knowledge creates a fertile opportunity for elites to 
manipulate public opinion or distort the interpretive messages sent through 
participatory acts. These conditions give rise to the potential for what Zaller 
calls "elite domination," where "elites induce citizens to hold opinions that they 
231. See ZALLER, supra note 150, at 30, 33-34, 80-85. 
232. Funk, supra note 188, at 198-203. 
233. PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RAcE 144 (presenting survey data showing 
that "substantial numbers of white respondents will change positions on racial policy issues when 
confronted with counterarguments"); James L. Gibson, A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in 
Persuading Russians To Tolerate, 42 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 819-50 (1998) (concluding that presentation of 
counterarguments was "quite effective" at changing Russians' initial responses to questions about 
political tolerance). 
234. Converse, supra note 230, at 245. But see Christopher H. Achen, Mass Political Attitudes and 
the Survey Response, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1218 (1975) (using empirical data to attack Converse's 
non-attitude thesis). 
235. R. Michael Alvarez & John Brehm, American Ambivalence Towards Abortion Policy: Develop-
ment of a Heteroskedastic Probit Model of Competing Values, 39 AM. J. PoL. SCI. 1055, 1077 (1995) 
(presenting study showing deep ambivalence and internal conflict over abortion-related issues); Dennis 
Chong, How People Think, Reason, and Feel About Rights and Liberties, 37 AM. J. POL. Sci. 867, 897 
(1993) (presenting study showing that "people experience considerable ambivalence over many civil 
liberties controversies"); Stanley Feldman & John Zaller, The Political Culture of Ambivalence: 
Ideological Responses to the Welfare State, 36 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 268, 293 (1992) (calling ambivalence "a 
fundamental feature" of public opinion about the welfare system). 
236. ZALLER, supra note 150, at 42-51. 
237. Id. at 6; Marc J. Hetherington, Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization, 95 
AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 619, 621-22 (2001). 
238. See, e.g., LuPIA & McCuBBINS, supra note 149, at 64; ZALLER, supra note 150, at 6; Franklin & 
Kosaki, supra note 168, at 369 ("[M]edia coverage of the Supreme Court is a key determinant of what 
people know of its decisions."). 
239. ZALLER, supra note 150, at 14, 45. 
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would not hold if aware of the best available information and analysis."240 
Several studies suggest that by "framing"241 a salient constitutional issue in a 
particular way, elites can significantly affect public opinion about that issue, 
including the 2000 presidential election, abortion, affirmative action, and civil 
liberties.242 Indeed, the potential for elite domination exists even during histori-
cal periods of high civic engagement and constitutional change.243 
Under conditions of elite domination, the choice between juricentric and 
popular-constitutionalist models is less stark than it initially appears. Rather 
than a battle between the Court and the People for interpretive authority, the real 
power struggle is between a small number of competing (and often self-
interested) elites-including the Court-that operate under a loose set of politi-
cal constraints brought about in large part by low levels of political knowledge. 
The People operate primarily as passive spectators, occasionally weighing in 
through periodic elections but remaining largely disengaged.244 
240. Id. at 313; see also Thomas E. Nelson & Donald R. Kinder, Issue Frames and Group-Centrism 
in American Public Opinion, 58 J. PoL. 1055 (1996) (arguing that citizens' public policy preferences are 
dependent on how issues are framed by elites). 
241. By framing, I refer to "the words, images, phrases, and presentation styles that a speaker uses 
when relaying information to another." James N. Druckman, The Implications of Framing Effects for 
Citizen Competence, 23 POL BEHAv. 225, 227 (2001); see also ZALLER, supra note 150, at 311-12 
(discussing elite manipulation of public opinion); Donald P. Haider-Markel & Mark R. Joslyn, Gun 
Policy, Opinion, Tragedy, and Blame Attribution: The Conditional Influence of Issue Frames, 63 J. PoL. 
520, 529 (showing that Jess knowledgeable citizens are more susceptible to elite issue-framing on 
opinions about proposed Jaw allowing carrying of concealed handguns). But see James N. Druckman & 
Kjersten R. Nelson, Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations Limit Elite Influence, 47 
AM. J. PoL. Sci. 729 (2003) (arguing that discussions with other citizens mediate the impact of elite 
influence). 
242. See Chong, supra note 235, at 898 (showing susceptibility of study participants to framing of 
civil liberties issues); Donald R. Kinder & Lynn M. Sanders, Mimicking Political Debate with Survey 
Questions: The Case of White Opinion on Affirmative Action for Blacks, 8 Soc. CooNmON 73, 96 ( 1990) 
(showing effects of framing on opinion about affirmative action); Thomas E. Nelson, Rosalee A. 
Clawson & Zoe M. Oxley, Media Framing of a Civil Libenies Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance, 91 
AM. PoL. Sa. REv. 567, 579 (1997) (showing how framing of a Ku Klux Klan march controversy as a 
"free speech" or "public safety" issue affects public opinion); Stephen P. Nicholson & Robert M. 
Howard, Framing Supponfor the Supreme Coun in the Aftermath of Bush v. Gore, 65 J. PoL. 676, 693 
(2003) (showing how framing Bush v. Gore affected specific and diffuse support for the Court). But see 
James N. Druckman, On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?, 63 J. PoL. 1041 (2001) 
(presenting two experiments suggesting that elite framing is constrained by the credibility of the 
frame's source). 
243. Ilya Somin, Voter Knowledge and Constitutional Change: Assessing the New Deal Experience, 
495 WM. & MARYL. REv. 595, 662-63 (2003) (concluding that New Deal economic legislation was the 
result of efforts by elites to exploit voter ignorance). 
244. Richard Posner calls this vision "Concept 2" democracy. Concept 2 democrats "see politics as a 
competition among self-interested politicians, constituting a ruling class, for the support of the people, 
also assumed to be self-interested, and to be none too interested in or well informed about politics .... 
It is rule by officials who are, however, chosen by the people and who if they don't perform to 
expectations are fired by the people at the end of a short fixed or limited term of office." PosNER, supra 
note 175, at 143-44. 
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B. PARTICIPATORY DISTORTION 
Even when the People speak, their input reflects the wide disparities in wealth 
and power that exist throughout American political life. As Christopher Eisgru-
ber points out, "constitutional theorists ... have not paid much attention to the 
possibility of a conceptual distinction between 'the electorate' and 'the 
people.' "245 For popular constitutionalists, the result of this oversight is a failure 
to acknowledge the distorted nature of the People's interpretive voice.246 
The process of citizen-interpreters opting in and out of constitutional culture 
creates the potential for "participatory distortion," a condition where "political 
activists do not reflect accurately the larger population from which they come 
with respect to some politically relevant characteristic."247 This distortion can 
take place on a large scale; participants fail to represent the polity as a whole. It 
can also occur on a smaller scale; elites who represent a particular group's 
interests fail to represent that group's policy preferences,248 or elected represen-
tatives fail to reflect the demography or ideological preferences of their constitu-
encies. 249 
In the most comprehensive study of participatory distortion to date, Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady concluded that political participants differ from the 
public at large in critical ways, particularly in demographic composition and 
political preferences. As a result, the political component of constitutional 
culture sends out distorted messages to political institutions about the People's 
interests, preferences, and needs. 250 
Wealth and education are the strongest predictors of political participation. 251 
The rich and well-educated are more likely to vote, sign petitions, attend rallies, 
contribute money, or work on campaigns.252 According to Verba and his co-
authors, with the exception of voting, the affluent are more than twice as likely 
245. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government and Judicial Review: A Reply to Five 
Critics, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 115, ll9 (2002). 
246. This omission reflects the invisibility of class in American social and legal discourse. See 
Deborah C. Malamud, "Who They Are---0r Were": Middle-Class Welfare in the Early New Deal, 151 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2019, 2019-20 (2003). 
247. VERBA, ScHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 178. 
248. Id. at 478-80 & n.14 (summarizing literature on participatory distortion among party elites and 
activists). For example, despite the general liberal bent among Latino elected officials, Latinos as a 
whole express significant skepticism about the merits of government assistance programs for the poor. 
249. Id. at 165 nn.3-4 (summarizing literature showing that elected representatives do not reflect the 
demographics of their constituencies). 
250. Id. at 464. 
251. See, e.g., CONWAY, supra note ll2, at 25-30; BENJAMIN GINSBERG & MARTIN SHEFrER, PoLmcs 
BY 0rnER MEANS: THE DECLINING IMPORTANCE OF ELECTIONS IN AMERICA 189-90 (1990); RosENSTONE & 
HANSEN, supra note 26, at 236-38; E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW 
OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 34-35 (2d ed. 1975) ("The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly 
chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent."); VERBA, ScHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 188; 
WOLFINGER & RosENSTONE, supra note 126, at 13-36. 
252. ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 236-38; VERBA, SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, 
at 190. 
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to be active in every other form of political activity.253 The close relationship 
between socioeconomic status and participation implicates race and sex as well. 
Demographic groups with comparatively lower levels of income and education, 
like African-Americans, Latinos, and women,254 are underrepresented among 
participants.255 
Echoing disparities in participation, "information about politics is as inequita-
bly distributed as wealth in the mass public."256 The most knowledgeable are 
disproportionately concentrated among the well educated,257 while political 
ignorance is highest among women, racial minorities, and the poor. 258 
These inequities in political knowledge are mirrored in the realm of constitu-
tional culture. Those with high levels of knowledge about the Court appear to 
share two characteristics: they are well educated, and they pay a lot of attention 
to politics outside the Court.259 For example, among the most politically aware, 
over 95% knew about the Webster decision, while virtually no one at the lower 
end of the awareness continuum knew anything about the case. 260 In particular, 
post-secondary education is significant in determining institutional knowledge 
about the Court. Delli Carpini and Keeter found that while fewer than one-third 
of high school graduates were able to identify who nominates Supreme Court 
justices or which branch of government determines the constitutionality of laws, 
80% of college graduates were able to correctly answer both questions.261 
Citizens who possess traits associated with higher socioeconomic status are 
also the greatest beneficiaries of participatory distortion. Since citizens with 
education and money participate at higher rates than the rest of the population, 
they gain an overrepresentative voice in constitutional culture.262 
This is particularly true for campaign contributions, which carry higher levels 
of distortion than any other participatory activity.263 As one might expect, 
campaign contributions are drawn disproportionately from the very well-off.264 
253. VERBA, SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 189; See also Theda Skocpol, Voice and 
Inequality: The Transformation of American Civic Democracy, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 1, 12 (2004) ("Ameri-
cans who are not wealthy or higher-educated now have fewer associations representing their values and 
interests, and enjoy dwindling opportunities for active participation."). 
254. CONWAY, supra note 112, at 34 ("Latino citizens have lower rates of voter registration and 
turnout and of engagement in other forms of political participation than do either white citizens or black 
citizens."); VERBA, ScHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 307-08. 
255. Conway reports that while women are as likely as men to vote in presidential and midterm 
elections, significant but diminishing disparities continue to exist in participation in campaign activity. 
See CONWAY, supra note 112, at 36-39; VERBA, ScHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 465. 
256. See Philip E. Converse, Information Flow and the Stability of Panisan Attitudes, 26 Pus. 
OPINION Q. 578, 582 (I 962). 
257. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 95, at 278. 
258. Id. at 177; Somin, supra note 153, at 6. 
259. Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 181, at 635, 653; Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 168, at 353. 
260. ZALLER, supra note 150, at 17-18. 
261. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 95, at 191-92. 
262. ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 236-38. 
263. VERBA, SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 516-17. 
264. Id. at 361, 482. 
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According to one study, the wealthiest 5% of the population supply 17% of 
campaign donors, while the poorest 16% supply only 4%.265 During the 2000 
election, households that earned over $100,000 were responsible for 85% of 
donations over $200, even though they comprised only 13.4% of the popula-
tion.266 Similar distortion effects are seen in citizen interactions with legislators. 
According to survey data collected between 1976 and 1988, while college-
educated people account for 35% of the population, they make up 56% of those 
who write letters to Congress.267 
In and of itself, demographic distortion is not necessarily a problem, as long 
as those who participate do a reasonably good job of reflecting the views of 
nonparticipants. Voting, the most common form of political participation, con-
tains far less ideological distortion than one might expect. Several studies 
confirm that voters, at least for now, do a reasonably good job of reflecting the 
policy (but not necessarily the interpretive) preferences of the country as a 
whole.268 
But other forms of participation are far more susceptible to ideological 
distortion. For example, compared with the population as a whole, campaign 
contributors are significantly more tolerant of different political viewpoints and 
adopt more conservative attitudes on economic issues.269 Not surprisingly, 
protesters-a critical group in many popular constitutionalist narratives-carry 
an ideologically liberal distortion.270 
VI. THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 
In light of the political science literature, we can now draw a few preliminary 
descriptive conclusions about the People's role in contemporary constitutional 
culture. 
265. ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 236-38. 
266. Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 73, 76 (2004). 
267. RosENSTONE & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 236. By contrast, those with the least education (10% 
of the population) make up 4% of those who write letters. Id. 
· 268. See, e.g., VERBA, ScHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 205 ("Voters and non-voters do not 
seem to differ substantially in their attitudes on public policy issues."); Michael M. Gant & William 
Lyons, Democratic Theory, Nonvoting, and Public Policy: The 1972-I988 Presidential Elections, 21 
AM. PoL. Q. 185, 194 (1993) (finding "no strong patterns of significant differences between voters and 
nonvoters" in thirty-five policy positions over five elections); Stephen D. Shaffer, Policy Differences 
Between Voters and Non-voters in American Elections, 35 W. PoL. Q. 496, 509 (1982) (presenting study 
showing "policy differences between voters and non-voters are presently neither large nor ideologically 
consistent"). But see PATTERSON, supra note 132, at 13 (citing polls suggesting that if all eligible adults 
had voted in the 2000 election, the Democrats would have won the Presidency and both houses of 
Congress); Jack Citrin, Eric Schickler & John Sides, What If Everyone Voted? Simulating the Impact of 
Increased Turnout in Senate Elections, 47 AM. J. PoL. Sc1. 75, 88 (2003) (concluding that there are 
"meaningful differences in the partisan leanings of voters and non-voters"). 
269. VERBA, ScHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 26, at 482, 505. For the questions used to gauge 
tolerance or economic opinion, see id. at 552, 555. 
270. Id. at 485. Verba et al. attribute this distortion to race and age: The protesting population 
contains more African-Americans and young people than the population as a whole. Id. at 485-87. 
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First, many Americans simply want nothing to do with constitutional culture. 
Moreover, to the extent the Court is engaging the People in a dialogue about 
constitutional aspirations, the People are not doing a particularly good job of 
holding up their end of the conversation. Apathy, disengagement, and low levels 
of political knowledge are enduring forces in modern political culture, and-if 
generational trends remain consistent-will continue to be for the foreseeable 
future. Their omission, particularly in policentrist narratives, creates an inaccu-
rate picture of constitutional culture in practice, one that gerrymanders recent 
political history to highlight isolated moments of civic engagement while 
whitewashing the distant relationship between large segments of the polity and 
the interpretive process. 
Second, the People do not serve as a particularly stable or reliable check on 
the Court's interpretive power. Popular interpretive preferences, where they 
exist, are often made without much awareness about politics generally, or the 
Constitution and the Court in particular. A public that is unaware of constitu-
tional culture cannot engage in a conversation about shared constitutional 
values with the Court or any other interpretive actors. Further, once a preference 
is ascertained, it often proves unstable and easily susceptible to elite influence, 
lending a distinctly dubious quality to popular communications across the 
law-politics divide. Political institutions seeking to discern interpretive prefer-
ences are left with a melange of conflicting information that is easily subject to 
manipulation. 
Third, constitutional culture reflects the disparities of wealth and power that 
permeate our political culture. Popular input is derived primarily from an 
unrepresentative minority of Americans that, curiously enough, shares many 
demographic traits with constitutional theorists and Supreme Court judges. 
Knowledge of and participation in constitutional culture are disproportionately 
concentrated among well-educated, financially secure individuals who are highly 
attentive to political life. Moreover, the increased use of checkbook participa-
tion reinforces the upper-crust complexion of popular constitutionalism in 
practice. Hence, while the composition of the Court is far from representative-
under virtually any demographic metric-granting the People heightened inter-
pretive input presents its own set of problems. 
Fourth, constitutional culture often acts to reinforce juricentric norms and 
legitimize judicial authority. As a forum for disagreement, many Americans see 
the courts as a preferable alternative to direct participation or a flawed political 
process. Even when the Court risks its political capital, as it did with Bush v. 
Gore, its public support remains solid.271 Further, a declining sense of external 
and internal efficacy leaves the People predisposed to outsource constitutional 
disagreements to judicial fora. 
271. See Friedman, supra note 95, at 2627-29; James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester 
Kenyatta Spence, The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted 
or Othenvise, 33 BRIT. J. PoL. Sc1. 535, 555 (2003). 
2005] POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND NOSTALGIA 935 
Finally, the contemporary political environment presents a number of serious 
operational challenges for increased popular constitutionalism in the foreseeable 
future. Younger generations disproportionately reflect overall declines in politi-
cal interest, participation, and efficacy. A citizen-interpreter who lacks faith in 
her own ability to master the skills necessary to participate in constitutional 
dialogues, or believes that political institutions are unresponsive to popular 
input, is unlikely to participate in constitutional culture. Moreover, a political 
culture that doubts the People's capacity for self-governance is unlikely to 
respond well to heightened popular input in constitutional lawmaking outside 
Article V. In such a context, it is likely that Americans, who already make 
interpretive decisions based on limited information, will doubt their ability to 
fully understand basic constitutional issues and opt out of the interpretive 
process. 
As realist democratic theorists have long held, declining levels of participa-
tion do not necessarily present an immediate threat to the People's ability to 
check institutional actors.272 Indeed, a dramatic increase in political participa-
tion could present a potential threat to democratic stability.273 Yet the decline is 
worrisome, if not for the present then for the future. As participation declines, it 
heightens the risk that constitutional meaning will reflect only the self-interest 
of a limited number of participants-primarily the rich and well-educated-
while effectively silencing the constitutional perspectives of a large segment of 
the American population.274 Decreased participation also means that constitu-
tional culture will become increasingly dominated by a small number of intense 
issue activists whose views differ substantially from those of nonparticipants.275 
Further, if one of popular constitutionalism's primary normative virtues is its 
ability to initiate a national conversation about constitutional values-to give 
the People a sense of ownership over the document and its meaning-this virtue 
is at risk when fewer people participate in constitutional culture. If the People 
are ill-equipped, unwilling, or unable to engage in a larger cultural dialogue 
about constitutional meaning, "constitutional culture" may amount to little more 
than an academic construction or a series of observations by pundits on a 
Sunday morning talk show. 
Despite efforts by policentrists to highlight the role of popular input in the 
development of constitutional doctrine, the moments of constitutional empower-
272. Griffin, supra note 21, at 526. 
273. CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 14 (1970) ("The fact that non-
democratic attitudes are relatively more common among the inactive means that any increase in 
participation by the apathetic would weaken the consensus on the norms of the democratic method."). 
274. The notion that our system of constitutional governance exists to promote the class-based 
interests of a political and economic elite has well-established theoretical roots. See CHARLES A. BEARD, 
AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913). 
275. See Steven Earl Bennett & David Resnick, The Implications of Nonvoting for Democracy in the 
United States, 34 AM. J. PoL. Sc1. 771, 800 (1990). Indeed, Mark Tushnet argues that America is in the 
midst of a "new constitutional order" marked by "a public that does not participate in politics and weak 
parties but highly partisan institutions in a divided government." TusHNET, supra note 56, at 19. 
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ment they point to often bear a distant relationship to contemporary reality. 
Moreover, for juridominant critics, a population that avoids participation in 
civic life, doubts its capacity to understand political issues, expresses skepticism 
about its ability to influence political outcomes, and has little interest in civic 
life, is a poor subject for constitutional models that rely upon voluntary participa-
tion as a necessary component. 
How can we explain the reluctance to acknowledge these trends-obvious to 
any political scientist-among popular constitutionalists? For one thing, consti-
tutional theorists have steadily avoided empirical studies of any kind, preferring 
to use normative or historical lenses to explain or advocate for interpretive 
developments.276 Moreover, as long as constitutional theorists remain commit-
ted to relitigating the countermajoritarian difficulty, 277 there will be a need to 
maintain democratic legitimacy within the political branches to counteract the 
antidemocratic features of judicial review.278 
But something else is at work. 
Contemporary constitutional theory is dominated by scholars who remain 
highly influenced by politically formative experiences from the civil rights 
era.279 They (or their mentors) attended college during an era of heightened 
political efficacy, and found themselves among others who shared a belief in 
their ability to change the political system.280 Protest was a primary means for 
accomplishing change,281 and many within this age cohort were actively en-
gaged in a popular constitutionalist discourse that centered around racial justice, 
women's rights, and class division. These experiences have brought historical 
instances of popular empowerment into sharp descriptive focus, while relegat-
ing much of contemporary political life into the background. 282 I mention this 
not to broadly pathologize a generation of scholars, but in an attempt to explain 
how constitutional theory, now decades into its development as a discipline, 
276. See Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Foreword: The Constitutionalization of 
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REv. 28, 41 (2004). 
277. See Friedman, History Pan Five, supra note 40, at 218-22 (describing the countennajoritarian 
difficulty as an "obsession" among academics). 
278. As Barry Friedman notes, constitutional theorists also overlook the numerous political con-
straints on the Court's interpretive discretion, including its institutional wellspring of diffuse support, 
institutional composition, and independent sensitivity to political dynamics. See Friedman, supra note 
95, at 2614-17. 
279. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 19, at 1090-92. 
280. The period between ages eighteen and twenty-six is "the most crucial age range for the creation 
of a distinctive, self-conscious political generation." M. KENT JENNINGS & RICHARD G. NIEMI, GENERA-
TIONS AND PoLmcs: A PANEL STUDY OF YOUNG ADULTS AND THEIR PARENTS 7 (1981). 
281. Id. at 333 ("For those who lived through the protest period it may have seemed that nearly 
every young person was a protestor, in either incipient or manifest form."); Jennings, supra note 103, at 
369 (estimating that three in ten of all college graduates had taken part in a demonstration, protest 
march, or sit-in between 1965 and 1973, a level far higher than the rest of the population). See supra 
note 219 for contemporary data on protesting. 
282. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULALLED 
HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 1-2 (2004) (describing "awe and respect" shown by educated elites to 
Brown, "a decision that promised so much and, by its terms, accomplished so little"). 
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continues to treat the People as a vague abstraction. 283 
If popular constitutionalists truly intend to view constitutional lawmaking as 
the product of a culture in which law and politics intersect, they can no longer 
treat politics and the People as interchangeable concepts. Indeed, if constitu-
tional theory is evolving from the normative search for a dominant interpretive 
paradigm to a descriptive inquiry into the political and legal interactions that 
underlie judicial review, 284 it is no longer sufficient to rely upon abstractions 
like "the People." 
Instead, our theoretical inquiry must become more sophisticated about how 
political realities operate within constitutional culture. For example, does wide-
spread political apathy offer an opportunity for an ambitious and confident 
Court to expand its interpretive authority? Do contemporary political conditions 
create incentives for interpretive restraint by other political institutions? Can a 
constitutional culture that operates under these conditions sustain its legitimacy? 
How prominent is the role of elite opinion and polarization? How do emotions 
operate within and influence constitutional culture? How exactly do courts 
internalize constitutional claims made outside the courtroom? How much legiti-
macy do extrajudicial constitutional norms have as law? Given relatively low 
levels of political knowledge, how credible are the conclusions we draw about 
popular interpretive preferences? How does the ebb and flow of participation 
affect constitutional interpretation and the behavior of courts? What levels of 
participation are necessary for a constitutional culture to sustain its democratic 
legitimacy? To what extent do the realities of participation and mobilization 
distort constitutional outcomes in favor of certain groups? How does constitu-
tional culture manifest itself on the state level?285 
More often than not, these questions have either gone unasked, or the 
answers lack empirical rigor. The result is constitutional theory that bears a 
skewed relationship to contemporary practice. 
CONCLUSION 
Our past informs our current perspective, bringing certain elements and 
structures into sharp focus while leaving others behind. This dynamic often 
plays itself out on a generational scale, 286 as particular age cohorts share a 
283. The notion that scholarship is influenced by historical paradigms that are often resistant to 
developing-and sometimes contradictory-facts is not new. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF 
SCIENTIRC REVOLUTIONS 62-65 (3d ed. 1996). For a description of how this dynamic has operated within 
constitutional theory, see Friedman, History Part Five, supra note 40, at 250 (describing mid-twentieth-
century theorists as "stuck in the paradigm of 'democratic faith' that they had inherited"). 
284. For an example of such an inquiry, see Barry Friedman, The Imponance of Being Positive: The 
Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 1257 (2005). 
285. For example, the recent state-by-state skirmishes over same-sex marriage provide a comprehen-
sive case study on the determination of constitutional meaning through complex interactions between 
the judiciary, the legislature, and the public. 
286. For the classic statement on generational theory, see Karl Mannheim, The Problem of Genera-
tions, in THE NEw PILGRIMS: YOUTH PROTEST IN TRANsmoN 101, 136 (Philip G. Altbach & Robert S. 
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common experiential point of reference that affects the style and content of their 
scholarship. It is no surprise, therefore, that scholars who formed their political 
consciousness during an era of heightened civic engagement would produce 
scholarship that seeks to integrate the role of social movements and politics into 
constitutional theory. 
In building upon their work, the post-Watergate generation faces a similar 
challenge-to integrate our formative experience with the darker side of politi-
cal life into the descriptive and normative course of constitutional theory. This 
will involve embracing empirical work that transcends barriers imposed by 
academic disciplines, and bringing greater sophistication to descriptive accounts 
of constitutional culture. All too often, generations of constitutional theorists 
have been seduced into the same modes of thinking as their predecessors.287 We 
must do our best to avoid that trap. 
Laufer eds., 1972) ("The phenomenon of generations is one of the basic factors contributing to the 
genesis of the dynamic of historical development."). 
287. See Friedman, History Part Five, supra note 40, at 255 (describing how mid-century constitu-
tional theorists "parroted their predecessors' words"); Friedman, supra note 78, at 938-39. 
